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The core of this Article describes some of the efforts, both within and outside the United 
States, to control the epidemic of intellectual property and information technology (IP 
and IT) theft. Those engaged in the battle include prosecutors and judges, individuals 
and trade associations, and politicians and policymakers from all points on the political 
spectrum. And yet, even with so many forces working to stem the tide, the losses are 
staggering.   
An innovator with the potential to change his or her future as well as the prosperity of the 
surrounding economy, whether in Kentucky or Kinshasa, will be dissuaded from 
innovating if that which they invent or produce is readily stolen. Individual and 
governmental enforcement efforts are making a difference, but success in dealing with 
this problem does not lie in any one or even several approaches. Instead, there is a need 
for coordinated and collective efforts, harnessing domestic and international resources. 
The enforcement and control mechanisms discussed in this Article show the power and 
limits of each approach. Taken in the aggregate, however, there is reason to think a 
global change is possible. In a word, the solution lies in partnership. 
Through constant and transparent dialogue and the sharing of ideas and resources, a 
partnership has the potential to reverse the rate and impact of IP and IT theft. It may be 
the only way to begin the process of achieving the most important goal: a cultural shift 
resulting in universal condemnation of entities and individuals engaged in piracy, 
counterfeiting, and other forms of IP and IT theft. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
¶1 This Article describes some of the efforts, both within and outside the United 
States, to control the epidemic of intellectual property and information technology (IP 
and IT) theft. Those engaged in the battle include prosecutors and judges, politicians and 
policymakers from all points on the political spectrum, domestic and multinational 
organizations, state and federal officials, representatives of the executive branch and 
independent agencies, individual litigants, and more. And yet, even with so many forces 
working to stem the tide, the losses are staggering.   
¶2 An innovator with the potential to change his or her future as well as the prosperity 
and success of the surrounding economy, whether in Kentucky, Kinshasa, Kazakhstan, or 
Kansas, will be dissuaded from innovating if that which they invent or produce is readily 
stolen. It is thus worth considering how the wrongfulness of outright IP and IT theft can 
be isolated and condemned, and then, how that condemnation can be communicated. 
Complex single-case enforcement actions in the United States or elsewhere, while 
absolutely essential, are not likely to be table-talk at the evening meal in most quarters. 
Public communication of an obvious but somehow ignored or flouted truth—that stealing 
valuable property is simply wrong, even though such theft has been made easier and 
more anonymous by modern technology—must be part of the solution to IP and IT theft.   
¶3 Individual and state-level efforts are making a difference, but success in dealing 
with this problem does not lie in any one or even several approaches. Instead, there is a 
need for coordinated and collective efforts, harnessing domestic and international 
resources. The enforcement and control mechanisms discussed in this Article show the 
power and limits of each approach. Taken in the aggregate, however, there is reason to 
think a real and global change is possible. In a word, the solution lies in partnership. In 
every sense of the term, partnership holds the potential for a meaningful diminution of IP 
and IT theft.   
¶4 For state enforcement, one of the recent shining lights in this field, jurisdictional 
issues will not be easily resolved. Enforcement outside of local court orders and the 
limited scope of remedies will remain a problem. Enforcement of federal statutory and 
regulatory claims also presents an opportunity to lessen IT and IP piracy and 
cybercrimes, but there are still inherent limits in statutes, uneven enforcement, unresolved 
matters relating to extraterritoriality, and of course problems marshaling sufficient 
political will and resources.  
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¶5 International and multinational organizations also hold promise but are plagued 
with many of the same problems faced by state and federal entities.1 The World Trade 
Organization2 and similar institutions committed to articulating and enforcing standards 
lack reliable and consistent juridical force. Moreover, efforts by international groups are 
hampered by the variation in enforcement will and resources between developing and 
emerging countries and the differences from country to country in (or nonexistence of) 
legal regimes for protecting IP and IT.    
¶6 Finally, there are private organizations, including individual companies, trade and 
other professional organizations, and domestic and multinational alliances, all dedicated 
to stemming the tide of intellectual property theft. Like the governmental entities 
described above, the will and motives are strong but the enforcement mechanisms and 
resources needed to make meaningful change are limited.3 Throughout this Article, I 
reference select efforts of organizations and entities to orchestrate a campaign to stop IP 
theft. All are laudable and have good intentions. Yet none has succeeded; none is truly 
global; and none effectively merges public and private resources.4   
¶7 In this environment, the most logical way to think about the problem of IP and IT 
theft boils down to partnership. One commentator noted that meaningful protection of IP 
and IT is a legal and cultural undertaking that will involve “thousands of detailed 
actions—data gathering and research, interagency coordination, work with the private 
sector, coordination with Congress, and interactions with foreign government agencies. 
This work must be done by expert officials across many departments and agencies 
working together in interagency teams with a great deal of private-sector outreach.”5   
1 There are a number of international organizations dedicated to protecting the rights of those who 
produce IP and IT. None have the reach, juridical force, resources, membership, reliable enforcement 
mechanisms, and other features of a true multidimensional transnational partnership. See, e.g., WORLD
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/portal/index.html.en (last visited Sept. 6, 2014); GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.theglobalipcenter.com/about/ 
mission-and-goals/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (focusing on raising awareness and “increasing support 
among key audiences”); INT’L ASS’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROP., https://www.aippi. 
org/?sel=aims (last visited Sept. 6, 2014) (discussing goals dedicated to development and improvement of 
regimes to protect IP); INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. INST., http://iipi.org/2010/07/background/ (last visited 
Sept. 6, 2014) (providing education and guidance for national leaders, particularly in developing countries). 
2 WORLD TRADE ORG., http://www.wto.org/ (last visited Jan. 29, 2014). 
3 The closest to the model proposed in this Article is the International Intellectual Property Alliance 
(IIPA). See About IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). Founded in 1984, the IIPA has 
tried for three decades, with only limited success, to develop rules and policies to protect IT and IP. It is a 
“private sector coalition . . . [with] over 3,200 U.S. companies . . . Members [include the] Association of 
American Publishers, Entertainment Software Association, Independent Film & Television Alliance, 
Motion Picture Association of America, National Music Publishers’ Association, and Recording Industry 
Association of America.” About IIPA, http://www.iipa.com/aboutiipa.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). It 
does not include the entire array of public-sector members needed to achieve the goals set out in this 
Article.  
4 The partnership between the National Crime Prevention Council and the Justice Department’s Bureau 
of Justice Assistance is an example of a public/private partnership that offers potential remedies, but thus 
far has had few identifiable results. Intellectual Property Theft: Get Real, NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION
COUNCIL, http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/ncpcs-intellectual-property-theft-campaign 
(last visited Sept. 5, 2014) (“Because intellectual property theft is so harmful, the National Crime 
Prevention Council, in partnership with the Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. 
Department of Justice, has launched a campaign to show how harmful it is—to all of us—and to help 
prevent it. Research shows that when people know the costs—and the dangers—of intellectual property 
theft, they take it much more seriously.”).  
5 DENNIS C. BLAIR ET AL., NAT’L BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH, THE IP COMMISSION REPORT: THE
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¶8  Through constant and transparent dialogue and the sharing of ideas and resources, a 
partnership has the potential to reverse the rate and impact of IP and IT theft.6 It may be 
the only way to begin the process of achieving the most important goal: a global change 
in fundamental beliefs resulting in a universal condemnation of IP and IT theft.  
II. THE IMPACT AND NATURE OF IP AND IT THEFT  
A. Supply-Chain Basics and Nondisclosure Agreements  
¶9  Research for this Article began with a study of supply chains and the hope of 
discerning the means, within a supply chain, to curtail IP and IT theft. Most products 
require and benefit from identifiable supply chains, and very few are exclusively local. 
Typically, an end-product comes to market as the result of varying forms of collaboration 
between multiple domestic and foreign actors functioning within a supply chain.7   
¶10  Most items in commerce begin with conceptualization, or IP of one type or another, 
followed by raw-product selection and initial fabrication, processing and assembly of 
component parts, unit assembly, packaging, and sale. It is highly likely that one or more 
of these activities occurs abroad.8 Effective product development and assembly along this 
chain often requires creation, transmission, and in effect, entrustment of valuable IP and 
IT to both domestic and foreign entities. In that process, control over IT and IP within the 
supply chain is essential, efficient, and bears inherent risk.   
¶11  In one sense, supply chains provide a vehicle to protect IP and IT, and in another, 
pose a vulnerability because of multiple actors with varying allegiances and motives. 
“The globalization of the supply chain for new—and increasingly interconnected—IT 
products will offer more opportunities for malicious actors to compromise [product] 
integrity and security.”9  
¶12  At first blush, the supply chain seems a safe haven where, for generations, basic 
nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) were used to protect IP and IT. However, NDAs can 
be ineffective, difficult and expensive to enforce, and cannot resolve the disclosure 
paradox that potentially exists between innovators, producers, and purchasers of the 
product.10 The haunting notion of an intellectual-property paradox cannot easily be 
 
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THEFT OF AMERICAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 63 (2013) [hereinafter IP 
COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://www.ipcommission.org/report/IP_Commission_Report_052213. 
pdf. 
6 One example of an attempt to coordinate multiple public and private actors is the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative, “a global coalition of governments, companies and civil society working together 
to improve openness and accountable management of revenues from natural resources.” What Is the EITI?, 
http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
7 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-361, IT SUPPLY CHAIN: NATIONAL SECURITY 
RELATED AGENCIES NEED TO BETTER ADDRESS RISKS 4 (2012), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/ 
590/589568.pdf. 
8 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, IP THEFT: REPORT HIGHLIGHTS SUPPLY CHAIN 
VULNERABILITIES (2013) [hereinafter CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, IP THEFT]. 
9 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. 
TRADE SECRETS 7 (2013) [hereinafter ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. 
TRADE SECRETS], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov//sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/admin_strategy_ 
on_mitigating_the_theft_of_u.s._trade_secrets.pdf.   
10 Jonathan M. Barnett, Intellectual Property as a Law of Organization, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 785, 798 
(2011).   
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dismissed and is not limited to the critique of NDAs. At its most basic level, the paradox 
is predicated on the necessary disclosure of information (necessary to protect IP and IT), 
and the presence of those within and with access to some aspect of a supply chain 
anxious to use but unwilling to pay for IP and IT.11 “NDAs typically protect against 
subsequent disclosure by the idea buyer to third parties, but not use by the idea buyer.”12  
While normally this paradox focuses on the innovator and the purchaser of the idea, this 
also has implications for IP and IT theft throughout any supply chain. 
¶13  If one assumes a societal willingness to steal and an historic unwillingness of some 
governmental entities, within and outside the United States, to expend resources to 
prosecute such theft, deterrence is stymied, and simple NDAs—or even complex judicial 
and administrative remedies for IP and IT theft—will not reliably protect the rights of 
owners. Similarly, while coding requirements and comparable protection measures (from 
passwords to complex, access-limitation algorithms) have historically provided some 
protection for software IP owners, such safeguards have not thwarted technology-savvy 
IP thieves.13 More is required. How much more ought to be driven by the sheer economic 
impact of IP and IT theft.   
B. Impact of IP and IT Theft 
¶14  Descriptions of the consequences of IP and IT theft vary only in amount. “Pirated 
software and other stolen intellectual property . . . affects every corner of an American 
economy . . . .”14 IP and IT “are two major drivers of U.S. economic growth and 
prosperity [and] cyber attacks threaten both.”15 The Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) estimated that cross-border trade in physical 
counterfeits and pirated products alone reached a value of $250 billion in 2007, 
representing a fraction of the scope and impact of IP violations worldwide.16   
¶15  It stands to reason that if those who invest money, time, and energy to create or 
invent different, better, and more efficient products cannot rely on IP and IT protection of 
their rights, their willingness to engage in this vital economic activity will decline. “Yet 
as bad as the economic and employment losses are, the OECD Commission notes that IP 
theft’s most insidious impact lies in undermining both the incentives and means to invest 
in innovative activity.”17   
 
11 For example, a patent discloses to the public the secrets of the invention. Those inclined to steal that 
information have their tasks as thieves made easier by the public filings patent protection requires.   
12 Barnett, supra note 10, at 798.   
13 See Yogesh Malhotra, Controlling Copyright Infringements of Intellectual Property: The Case of 
Computer Software—Part One, 45 J. OF SYS. MGMT. 32 (1994) (“Most technological solutions devised to 
prevent unauthorized copying of computer software have provided only temporary protection against 
software theft.”).  
14 Rob McKenna, Defending U.S. Intellectual Property, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/26/defending-us-intellectual-property/?page=all. 
15 John Dowdy, The Cybersecurity Threat to U.S. Growth and Prosperity, in SECURING CYBERSPACE: A 
NEW DOMAIN FOR NATIONAL SECURITY 129, 134 (Nicholas Burns & Jonathon Price eds., 2012). 
16 DANIEL SANDY BAYER, RONALD E. BERENBEIM, & REBECCA WALKER, SAFEGUARDING 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESSING CORRUPTION IN THE GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 11, 13, 19, 30, 36, 
47 (2012). 
17 Stephen Ezell, Stop Thief! Time to Limit US IP Theft, THE HILL’S CONG. BLOG (June 10, 2013, 2:00 
PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/304231-stop-thief-time-to-limit-us-ip-theft-. 
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¶16  A well-funded global partnership of prosecutors, politicians, policymakers, 
domestic and multinational organizations, state and federal officials, and representatives 
of the executive branch and independent agencies—the enforcement cohort mentioned at 
the outset of this Article—could formulate a strategy to begin to undo the belief that it is 
acceptable to steal, whether by downloading, file-sharing, or other forms of piracy.  
¶17  Various organizations18 and academicians alike argue that the losses sustained are 
either exaggerated or inconsequential.19 I disagree. By any measure, piracy accounts for 
billions of dollars in lost value,20 which leads to three conclusions. First, IP and IT theft 
exact an enormous cost on the U.S. and global economy. Second, the means to prevent 
such theft are limited and ineffective given the magnitude of the problem.21 Third, there 
is little agreement between commentators on the best way to calculate or describe the 
magnitude of the loss.  
¶18  The International Trade Commission (ITC)22 estimated that in 2009, the American 
IP-intensive economy lost “$48.2 billion in sales, royalties, or license fees due to IPR 
infringement in China” alone.23 A study focused solely on software estimates that “the 
global piracy rate for PC software hovers at 42 percent,” and the “commercial value of 
this shadow market of pirated software climbed from $58.8 billion in 2010 to $63.4 
billion in 2011, a new record, propelled by PC shipments to emerging economies where 
piracy rates are the highest.”24    
¶19  In the U.S. economy, IP and IT accounts for “40 percent of the U.S. GDP, 74 
percent of U.S. exports, and supports over 40 million U.S. jobs.”25 The Director of the 
National Security Agency reported that IT and IP theft exacts an annual cost of $320 
billion and is responsible for the loss of millions of jobs, declaring this ongoing theft the 
“greatest transfer of wealth in history.”26 Given the enormity of these losses, a reduction 
of piracy by merely ten percent over four years in California alone would “generate over 
 
18 This Article is premised on the belief that protection of IP and IT is fundamental to healthy economies 
and essential for sustained invention, creativity, and innovation. There are those who take the position that 
IP and IT are overprotected and that the real challenge in this field is to ensure information transparency to 
free up IP and IT to the public. Organizations like the Global Network Initiative pursue this goal, taking the 
position that “domestic laws and policies [protecting IP and IT] may conflict with the internationally 
recognized human rights of freedom of expression and privacy.” GLOBAL NETWORK INITIATIVE, 
http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/ (last visited Jan. 26, 2014). 
19 See, e.g., Andrew Rens, Collateral Damage: The Impact of ACTA and the Enforcement Agenda on the 
World’s Poorest People, 26 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 783, 784–85 (2011) (arguing that there is no legitimate 
purpose “to enact national laws and create policies and practices which effectively eliminate existing 
limitations and exceptions in the current international intellectual property regime, at least with regard to 
cross border regulations of intellectual property”). 
20 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, SHADOW MARKET: 2011 BSA SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 4 (2012), 
available at http://globalstudy.bsa.org/2011/downloads/study_pdf/2011_BSA_Piracy_Study-Standard.pdf.  
21 See, e.g., Robert G. Picard, A Note on Economic Losses Due to Theft, Infringement, and Piracy of 
Protected Works, 17 J. OF MED. ECON. 207, 209 (2004).    
22 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/ (last visited Jan. 30, 2014). 
23 Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Enforcement, What Enforcement?, 52 IDEA J. OF L. & TECH. 239, 245 
(2012).   
24 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 20, at 1.  
25 Stephen Ezell, GAO Report on Economic Impact Underwhelms, THE HILL’S CONG. BLOG (July 12, 
2013, 6:00 PM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/technology/310691-gao-report-on-economic-
impact-from-ip-theft-underwhelms#ixzz2eLEf4odP. 
26 Id. 
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$4 billion in new economic activity and $660 million in additional tax revenue.”27 
Nationally, a recent study highlights the negative impact that global software piracy has 
on U.S. manufacturers concerning jobs, revenue, and innovation.28     
¶20  According to one commentator, “the average company lost $101.9 million in 
revenues and incurred costs of $1.4 million in identification and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights, leading to an average decline in profits of $46.3 million.”29  
At least one source—U.S. Customs and Border Protection—has a precise way to describe 
the phenomenon: “[In 2011, it] seized 24,792 counterfeit or pirated goods, a 24.2 percent 
increase over the amount of goods seized in 2010.30 These seized goods represented more 
than $1.1 billion in lost sales.”31  
¶21  According to a U.S. Department of Commerce report, the vast majority of the U.S. 
economy relies on IP in some form.32 Of 313 total industries accounted for by the study, 
75 are IP-intensive and account for 27.1 million American jobs (18.8 percent of all 
employment in the U.S. economy in 2010).33 In 2010, IP-intensive industries comprised 
34.8 percent of U.S. GDP (around $5.06 trillion in value added).34 Furthermore, 60.7 
percent of all U.S. merchandise exports came from IP-intensive industries.35   
¶22  Andrew Hupert of Best Practices China, a consulting firm, maintains a website to 
help westerners negotiate more successfully in mainland China through a compilation of 
interactive online resources.36 Hupert notes that while IP theft is declining in China, “IP 
theft is still the rule rather than the exception.”37 The risk is continuous. Hupert warns: 
“Westerners considering doing business in China have to plan on someone making a play 
for [their] IP. It’s not a matter of ‘if,’ but ‘when’—and ‘who.’ If your technology is any 
good, someone in your China supply chain is going to try to access it . . . if someone 
doesn’t try to steal your designs and ideas, then something is wrong with your product or 
process.”38 
 
27 Calif. Workers Lose Billions in Wages Due to IT Piracy, PR NEWSWIRE (Jan. 25, 2012), 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/report-calif-workers-lose-billions-in-wages-due-to-it-piracy-
138063268.html.    
28 WILLIAM KERR & CHAD MOUTRAY, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF GLOBAL SOFTWARE THEFT ON U.S. 
MANUFACTURING COMPETITIVENESS AND INNOVATION 4 (2014) (“We estimate that reducing the global 
software piracy rate by 2.5 percentage points per year for 4 years would create 27,239 new manufacturing 
jobs, add $8.7 billion dollars to U.S. GDP, and generate $29.0 billion in revenue to manufacturers.”). 
29 STAFF OF CHAIRMAN OF JOINT ECON. COMM., 112TH CONG., THE IMPACT OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY THEFT ON THE ECONOMY 2 (Comm. Print 2012), available at http://www.jec.senate.gov/ 
public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=aa0183d4-8ad9-488f-9e38-7150a3bb62be. 
30 Id.  
31 Id.; See OFFICE OF INT’L TRADE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS FISCAL YEAR 2011 SEIZURE 
STATISTICS (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/iprcenter/pdf/ipr-fy-2011-seizure-report.pdf; 
Policy Feature Issue: Global Intellectual Property Theft, HOUSE REPUBLICANS (June 4, 2013), 
http://www.gop.gov/blog/13/06/04/policy-feature-issue-global-intellectual-property-theft. 
32 STAFF OF CHAIRMAN OF JOINT ECON. COMM., supra note 29. 
 33 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 11.   
34 Id.   
35 Id.  
36 See Andrew Hupert, IP Theft in China—Cost of Doing Business or Barrier to Entry, 
CHINESENEGOTIATION.COM (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.chinesenegotiation.com/2012/08/ip-theft-in-
china-cost-of-doing-business-or-barrier-to-entry/. 
37 See id. 
38 See id. 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  J O U R N A L  O F  T E C H N O L O G Y  A N D  I N T E L L E C T U A L  P R O P E R T Y  [ 2 0 1 4  
 
 260
¶23  Without reliable IP and IT protection, it is questionable whether the United States, 
or any country, could sustain the essential incentives for creativity, invention, and 
efficiency. As global theft of IT and IP through the supply chain increases, “American 
software developers are discouraged from investing in new technology and products 
when they know their software will be stolen.”39 This affects both inventors and 
investors. “IP theft’s most insidious impact lies in undermining both the incentives and 
means to invest in innovative activity.”40 Viewed alone, no one enforcement regime can 
solve the problem. Viewed collectively, and operating in a coordinated manner, the 
complete array of domestic and international efforts, both public and private, can begin to 
turn the tide.  
¶24  One final point on the impact of IP and IT theft requires no documentation: theft 
costs money. However you assess the problem, stolen IP and IT, viewed globally, has a 
price tag that runs into the trillions of dollars. A sustained, coordinated global campaign 
by public and private actors, as suggested in this Article, resulting in public support for 
criminal prosecution, civil enforcement, regulatory sanctions, and most importantly, a 
transnational cultural shift in public understanding of the hazards of IP and IT theft 
should bring down the cost of piracy. That gives rise to two highly desirable outcomes: 
more resources and thus motivation for innovation, creativity, and invention, and reduced 
prices for goods and services.   
¶25  Common and necessary products that consist predominantly of IP and IT41 carry a 
fairly high price tag.42 High prices on essential items provide powerful motivation for 
theft.43 It stands to reason that lower prices will decrease that motivation and the 
prevalence of theft.    
¶26  The cost of theft is incorporated into the price of all predominantly IT- and IP-
based products. Greatly reduce or eliminate the theft, and the theft-driven cost component 
diminishes. While it could be that reduced theft, and correspondingly, reduced theft costs, 
will translate solely into greater net profit, that is an inefficient outcome. If prices stay 
high, a powerful incentive for theft remains.44 Thus, it is not in a producer’s financial 
interest to maintain that theft incentive. Over time, significant reductions in theft should 
produce concomitant reductions in price, leading to less motivation for theft, stabilized 
profitability, and renewed incentives for invention and innovation.        
 
39 McKenna, supra note 14. 
40 Ezell, supra note 17.  
41 For example, essential software including programs for word-processing, e-communication, 
accounting, management, information gathering and organization, and other common uses, or hardware 
such as laptop computers or any form of e-pad—made by any legitimate producer. 
42 There are thousands of websites that discuss the high cost of IP- and IT-dominant software and 
hardware. Use any search engine with “high cost of software and computer hardware” and take your pick. 
Google reports about 66,700,000 results with this search. GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/ (last searched 
Sept. 6, 2014). There are likewise innumerable sites that explain in simple terms how to steal software. This 
author chooses not to provide a roadmap or instructional website on how to achieve the objective this 
Article seeks to prevent. 
43 See Joseph C. Nunes et al., Why Are People So Prone to Steal Software? The Effect of Cost Structure 
on Consumer Purchase and Payment Intentions, 23 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 43, 43 (2004), available 
at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/christopher.hsee/vita/Papers/WhyArePeopleSoProne.pdf. 
44 Id. 
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C. The Nature of Theft in the Supply Chain 
¶27  U.S. companies operate internationally through trans-boundary supply chains and 
an increasingly globalized workforce supported by international capital markets.45 The 
multinational nature of business increases the probability of “inadvertent, accidental or 
willful disclosure of confidential information and trade secrets.”46 When IP theft takes 
place beyond U.S. borders, there is limited recourse in domestic courts stemming, in part, 
from the difficulties associated with securing in personam jurisdiction over foreign 
defendants and the problem of enforcing domestic judgments outside the United States.47   
¶28  Beyond jurisdictional problems, the stark reality exists that IP and IT theft within 
and surrounding international supply chains occurs in numerous forms, some of  
which are extraordinarily difficult to track. Certain types of IP theft are apparent, 
undertaken by employees at a very tactile or personal level. “Hard drives are either 
duplicated on site or physically stolen by bribed employees [and] employees are planted 
temporarily in companies or permanent employees leave and illegally share proprietary 
information . . . .”48   
¶29  Other types of IP theft, while equally pernicious, are more difficult to track. 
“[P]roducts are dissected, re-engineered [and the original is returned intact] . . . . [The 
counterfeit product is then] sold without permission or payment of royalties [and] 
digitized products are pirated and sold illegally . . . .”49 Another variety of IP theft 
involves misconduct by third parties not part of the direct line of production: “[P]hones 
are tapped for the purpose of obtaining trade secrets; and email accounts are 
compromised.”50 The IP Commission Report51 mentions the different types of IP theft 
across sectors and the difficulties of measuring that theft.52 Certain localized thefts are 
nearly invisible to the rights holder since the end-product reaching the United States does 
not reveal the misconduct, i.e., the product imported is not diminished yet the property of 
the inventor has been appropriated. 
¶30  IP and IT theft is also seen as private-sector counterfeiting. The U.S. Department of 
Commerce includes in its definition of counterfeiting: electronics products that are 
unauthorized copies, which do not conform with the original component manufacturer 
 
45 David S. Almeling, Seven Reasons Why Trade Secrets Are Increasingly Important, 27 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 1091, 1110–11 (2012).   
46 DONNA GHELFI, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., THE ‘OUTSOURCING OFFSHORE’ CONUNDRUM: 
AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PERSPECTIVE 8 (2005), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ 
sme/en/documents/pdf/outsourcing.pdf. 
47 See Christopher L. Blakesley & Dan E. Stigall, The Myopia of U.S. v. Martinelli: Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction in the 21st Century, 39 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 1, 3 (2007). See generally Andrew F. 
Popper, Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to IP Theft, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 27 
(2013); Andrew F. Popper, In Personam and Beyond the Grasp: In Search of Jurisdiction and 
Accountability for Foreign Defendants, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 155 (2013). 
48 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 11. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 See RONALD KIRK, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2012 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2012), 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/2012%20Special%20301%20Report_0.pdf; DEMETRIOS 
MARANTIS, OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2013 SPECIAL 301 REPORT (2013), available at 
http://www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/05012013 percent202013 percent20Special percent20301 
percent20Report.pdf.   
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(OCM), are not produced by the OCM, are off-specification or defective yet sold as new, 
or have false markings or documentation.53 This definition includes pharmaceuticals and 
even “government[al] . . . weather communication system[s],”54 and further suggests that 
counterfeiting information technology can endanger consumer safety and national 
security.55 
¶31  Counterfeiting occurs with both entire product lines and component parts of end 
products. Risks regarding stolen IP and IT run the expanse of the supply chain, from raw 
materials to final product, compounding the difficulties of controlling or reducing theft.56  
¶32  While one might think of IT and IP theft as a set of corporate decisions made by 
third-world multinationals determined to pirate and exploit the IT and IP of others, the 
actual thieves do not always fit that description. John Dowdy57 presents a different image 
of IP and IT pirates. They are often young, twice as likely to live in an emerging 
economy as in a mature economy (38 percent as opposed to 15 percent),58 and “install 
nearly four times as many programs of all sorts per new [personal computer] as do 
frequent pirates in mature markets.”59 Given that profile (younger and tech-savvy), it is 
worth asking what mechanisms would dissuade IP and IT theft. Would a U.S. 
enforcement action change the mind of a person who lives in an emerging economy and 
profits greatly from such theft? Would a U.S. enforcement action deter a tech-savvy IP 
thief in the developing world who needs but cannot afford access to expensive products 
that are dependent on or consist primarily of IP or IT?   
¶33  This becomes a particularly challenging question in light of the belief structure or 
attitudes of those who want or need to make use of the IP or IT of another, but do not 
want to (or cannot) pay for it. As one commentator noted, “There’s no social stigma 
attached to being a downloader the way that there is to, say, shoplifting . . . . [Even those] 
generally opposed to [unlawful] downloading . . . don’t think of downloaders as morally 
repugnant people.”60 This problematic belief structure plays a powerful role in coming to 
grips with this issue. 
¶34  In order to have a shot at reframing the belief structure of those described above, 
massive and sustained public information and educational programs should be initiated at 
the global level if there is to be some hope of influencing such behavior. Second, there 
ought to be a public and sustained across-the-board buy-in by governments of the basic 
 
53 U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE ASSESSMENT: COUNTERFEIT ELECTRONICS 
212 (2010), available at http://www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/forms-documents/doc_view/37-defense-
industrial-base-assessment-of-counterfeit-electronics-2010.   
54 Daniel Baldwin, Assistant Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Protection, Speech to the International 
Law Enforcement IP Crime Conference (June 26, 2008). 
55 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS FROM COUNTERFEITS IN 
THE SUPPLY CHAIN (2012) [hereinafter CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, HEALTH AND SAFETY 
RISKS]. 
56 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, IP THEFT, supra note 8. 
57John Dowdy is an IP commentator and director at McKinsey & Company. MCKINSEY & CO., 
http://www.mckinsey.com/client_service/aerospace_and_defense/people/john_dowdy (last visited Sept. 6, 
2014).   
58 BUS. SOFTWARE ALLIANCE, supra note 20, at 1.    
59 Id. at 2.  
60 Brian Spears, Missing the Point on Content Piracy, THE RUMPUS (Jan. 28, 2012), 
http://therumpus.net/2012/01/missing-the-point-on-content-piracy/; see Peter Lewin, Creativity or 
Coercion: Alternative Perspectives on Rights to Intellectual Property, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 441, 445 (2007).   
Vol. 12:4] Andrew F. Popper 
 263 
premise that theft of IP and IT is a wrongful act with significant and far-reaching 
negative consequences.61   
¶35  As the materials that follow demonstrate, within the United States, there are 
ongoing prosecutions and public-information campaigns, as well as a presidential 
commission, all focused on IP and IT theft. Some of these efforts as well as some broad-
based international initiatives follow. 
III. DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS THEFT IN THE SUPPLY CHAIN 
¶36  In 2012, the Business Software Alliance (BSA) issued a report detailing tens of 
billions of dollars annually in lost value within the United States as a consequence of 
stolen IP and IT “driven primarily by theft in emerging market economies such as China, 
Russia, India, and Brazil.”62 For U.S. businesses, “this is like trying to compete when 
two-thirds of your competitors do not have to pay for basic costs of doing business, like 
rent or utilities.”63 Finding a solution to stolen IP and IT is hard enough. Finding a 
solution when the primary actors causing harm in the United States are outside the 
country makes this a far more challenging problem.   
¶37  When foreign entities are involved, the most basic approach to prevention is § 337 
of the Tariff Act of 1930, allowing either the ITC or an injured party to pursue sanctions 
including a ban on those products made with stolen or infringed IP and IT.64 Section 337 
has been interpreted as applicable to misappropriation of trade secrets occurring outside 
the United States when the products produced through the misappropriation are imported 
to the United States.65 In 2011, the ITC published a report on the need for and uses of this 
section, though to date there has been no meaningful follow-up.66 Moreover, the 
explosion in IP and IT theft has taken place notwithstanding the enforcement option of  
§ 337, suggesting the necessity for other approaches. As with every other sanction or 
remedy mentioned, § 337 is part of the solution, even though on its own it has not been, 
and will not be, the answer to the IP-theft problem. 
¶38  Assuming one can secure jurisdiction, one approach is state common law claims. 
For example, unjust enrichment, like other unfair competition claims, could allow the use 
of “old laws . . . to address specific abuses of intellectual property rights that threaten 
 
61 While members of the WTO agree generally to this precept, there are significant qualifiers. The World 
Trade Organization implementation of this “pledge” is in TRIPS. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1C, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS]. “Members shall ensure that enforcement 
procedures as specified in this Part are available under their law so as to permit effective action against any 
act of infringement of intellectual property rights covered by this Agreement, including expeditious 
remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a deterrent to further infringements.” Id. 
art. 41. Articles 65 and 66 extend the time frame for compliance as long as ten years for developing 
countries that do not have in place any semblance of an IP-protecting legal system. Id. art. 65–66.  
62 David J. Kappos & Gregory R. Baden, Combating IP Theft Using Unfair Competition Law, N.Y.L.J. 
(May 6, 2013), available at http://www.cravath.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Publications/ 
3409818_1.pdf. 
63 Id. 
64 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006). 
65 TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
66 China: Effects of Intellectual Property Infringement and Indigenous Innovation Policies on the U.S. 
Economy, Inv. No. 332-519, USITC Pub. 4226 (May 2011) (Final).  
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competition in the market.”67 University of Pennsylvania legal scholar, Professor 
Shyamkrishna Balganesh, observed, “[T]here exists a rather robust body of state law that 
is almost entirely the creation of state courts and is directed at creating entitlements in 
information, ideas, expression, goodwill, one’s image, and other related intangibles. 
These rights regimes are in turn collectively referred to as ‘common law intellectual 
property.’”68   
¶39  It is essential to make sure there is public awareness of both the IP- and IT-theft 
problem and the legal enforcement proceedings thereof. For example, Mississippi’s 
Intellectual Property Crime Center, an entity designed to inform citizens of the dangers of 
IP theft, and how to identify and report violations thereof, illustrates this objective.69  
Centers or other organizations of this nature can play an important role not only in 
identifying IP theft, but also in sponsoring and promoting the marketing, educational, and 
advertising programs needed for the critical cultural change—the across-the-board public 
understanding and rejection of IT theft.   
¶40  Beyond public education, there is an essential role for state civil and criminal 
enforcement. State laws typically emphasize an unfair trade or unfair competition 
approach with “state attorneys general . . . using the tools of unfair competition law in an 
attempt to level the playing field for American competitors.”70 State statutes often 
provide a broader definitional standard for unfair competition than federal law,71 and in 
some states can “provide for a private right of action [for] misappropriated IT.”72  
¶41  Fourteen states have adopted or are considering new statutes that address 
unauthorized use of IT.73 These statutes can push beyond substantive limitations of 
common law claims to get at varying aspects of the theft of IT and IP. For example, 
Washington’s unfair competition statute74 does not require the incorporation of the stolen 
IT or IP into the product sold in the state:  
[I]t is sufficient for liability . . . if the IT is used in business operations 
(such as distribution, sales and marketing, inventory, logistics and 
accounting). Thus a supplier’s illegal use of software in its business 
 
67 Emilio Varanini, The Use of Unfair Competition Laws to Address Intellectual Property Practices that 
Injure Market Competition, 2013 A.B.A. SEC. ANTITRUST L. 8, available at http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/20130626_at13626_materials.authcheckdam.pdf. 
68 Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragmatic Incrementalism of Common Law Intellectual Property, 63 
VAND. L. REV. 1543, 1544 (2010). 
69 See MISS. INTELLECTUAL PROP. CRIME CTR., http://mipcc.ago.state.ms.us/DidYouKnow.aspx (last 
visited Sept. 6, 2014).  
70 Kappos, supra note 62. 
71 See Varanini, supra note 67. 
72 Kappos, supra note 62. 
73 These states are Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. See ARTHUR M. 
MITCHELL III ET AL., WHITE & CASE, THE EMERGING RISKS OF UNAUTHORIZED IP IN YOUR SUPPLY CHAIN 
AND HOW YOU SHOULD RESPOND 8–9 (2013); Daniel Shickich, Finding Safe Harbor: Navigating 
Washington’s New Unfair Competition Law, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 1, n.19 (2012) (enumerating 
those states that have considered but not passed legislation designed to facilitate prosecution of IP and IT 
theft).  
 74 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.330.020 (2011).  
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operations would put the supplier—and potentially the company that relies 
on that supplier in its supply chain—squarely in the law’s crosshairs.75   
¶42  While a number of states have taken aim at IT and IP theft,76 the scope of the 
global problem is far too great to expect that isolated state enforcement will be sufficient. 
Nonetheless, the states’ actions are a critical and impressive step forward. “With little 
apparent help on the horizon from federal officials, concerted efforts by business and 
state attorneys general could prove a strong weapon to claw back some of the billions of 
dollars in ill-gotten advantage foreign companies are enjoying . . . .”77   
¶43  Both Massachusetts78 and California79 have prosecuted IT and IP thefts using 
similarly broad laws to hold companies and their global suppliers accountable.80  
Tennessee has also taken an aggressive and positive role enforcing its unfair competition 
law, and recently initiated a case against an overseas manufacturer using stolen IP.81 A 
Washington case, brought against the Brazilian airplane-manufacturing giant Embraer 
using the aforementioned Washington statute,82 was recently settled, indicating the power 
of state laws to influence behavior outside the United States.83 These state cases give 
hope to victims of IT and IP theft, but cannot resolve certain overt roadblocks to 
enforcement. First, federal law occasionally still preempts potential actions under state 
law.84 Second, the jurisdictional problems associated with domestic enforcement are 
considerable.85 Third, the remedial potential of state cases is limited, particularly when 
one of the key actors involved in the theft resides outside the United States.   
 
75 MITCHELL III ET AL., supra note 73, at 9. 
76 As discussed supra note 73, prosecution of IT or IP theft has gone forward in California, Illinois, 
Kentucky, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin. 
77 Kappos, supra note 62. 
78 Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to G.L. c. 93A, § 5 ¶ 5, Commonwealth v. Narong Seafood 
Co., No. 12-3825A (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2012) (discussing prosecution and imposition of fines on Narong, a 
Thailand-based seafood processer); see Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Mass., Company Fined for Using 
Pirated Software to Gain Unfair Advantage over Massachusetts Business (Oct. 18, 2012), available at 
http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2012/2012-10-18-narong-seafood-co.html. 
79 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Kamala D. Harris 
Files Unfair Competition Lawsuits over Use of Pirated Software in Apparel Industry (Jan. 24, 2013), 
available at http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-kamala-d-harris-files-unfair-
competition-lawsuits-over-use. 
80 MITCHELL III ET AL., supra note 73, at 10. 
81 See State AGs Developing Groundbreaking Solutions to Battle IT Theft and Unfair Competition, ABA 
Panelists Report, WALL ST. J. (June 26, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/article/PR-CO-20130626-
909922.html. 
82 WASH. REV. CODE § 19.330.020 (2011). 
83 See Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Washington’s New Unfair Competition Law 
Protects Local Company from Software Piracy (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
pressrelease.aspx?id=31143#.UmvisV_D-T8. 
84 See TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“The question of 
what law applies in a section 337 proceeding involving trade secrets is a matter of first impression for this 
court. We hold that a single federal standard, rather than the law of a particular state, should determine 
what constitutes a misappropriation of trade secrets sufficient to establish an ‘unfair method of 
competition’ under section 337.”). 
85 See generally Andrew F. Popper, Beneficiaries of Misconduct: A Direct Approach to IP Theft, 17 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 27 (2013) (discussing issues with domestic enforcement); Andrew F. Popper, 
In Personam and Beyond the Grasp: In Search of Jurisdiction and Accountability for Foreign Defendants, 
63 CATH. U. L. REV. 155 (2013) (discussing jurisdictional issues). 
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A. A Sampling of State Cases 
¶44  Many IP and IT theft cases and most trade secret cases are adjudicated in state 
courts.86  Since a number of state laws provide opportunities to address different types of 
IT or IP theft,87 it is worth looking at some examples of what different states have done to 
deal with the problem.   
1. California  
¶45  California recently filed suit88 against two apparel manufacturers for using pirated 
software.89 The defendants, one Chinese and one Indian, allegedly used software without 
paying the licensing fees, which gave them a “substantial and unfair” cost advantage over 
their competitors in California.90 In announcing the prosecution, State Attorney General 
Kamala Harris blamed IP and IT piracy for the loss of “nearly 400,000 manufacturing 
and technology jobs over the past decade to countries where piracy rates are as high as 80 
percent.”91 
¶46  In a recent setback for California, an international defendant’s motion to quash 
service of process was granted.92 This case illustrates both a state’s resolve to address IP 
and IT theft and the common problems associated with litigating against foreign 
defendants. The case centers on Pangang Group, “a state-owned enterprise of the 
People’s Republic of China[], controlled by the State-Owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission of the State Council.”93 California state agents, unable to 
serve process on Pangang in China, served an office manager of a company doing 
business in the United States for Pangang and sent four copies of the summons via 
certified mail to Pangang’s New Jersey office.94   
¶47  Pangang moved to quash service of process pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 4(c).95 Rule 4(c)(2) allows a “summons [to] be served ‘within the jurisdiction 
of the United States or anywhere else a federal statute authorizes an arrest.’”96 The court 
pointed out that service of process in a criminal case requires personal service of 
 
86 See Leggett & Platt v. Hickory Springs Mfg., 285 F.3d 1353, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (addressing trade 
secret misappropriation of a patented bedding foundation based on the Illinois Trade Secrets Act); Group 
One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1049–50 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (applying Missouri common 
law, since the Missouri trade secret law was inapplicable to acts occurring prior to 1995, to analyze trade 
secret misappropriation of a patented ribbon-curling method). 
87 McKenna, supra note 14. Requesting federal action, however, “need not preclude state enforcement of 
intellectual property protections, either.” Id. “While states are a key battleground . . . we need a federal 
solution.  Federal enforcement would elevate public awareness and provide a powerful national remedy to a 
problem that is clearly national in its impact and scope.” Id.  
88 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 79. 
89 Id. 
90 MITCHELL III ET AL., supra note 73, at 9 (citing Complaint for Injunction and Civil Penalties, 
California v. Pratibha Syntex Ltd., No. BC499751 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2013); Complaint for Injunction and 
Civil Penalties, California v. Ningbo, No. BC499771 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2013)).    
91 Press Release, Office of the Att’y Gen., Cal. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 79. Further, this has drained 
California of $1.6 billion in value and $700 million in lost taxes. Id.  




96 Id. at 1057. 
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defendants or the defendants’ “general agent.”97 To be the general agent, the court 
required the government to show that the party served in the United States was “the alter-
ego”98 of the defendant, something the government could not do. Accordingly, the court 
granted the defendants’ motion and quashed service on the defendants.   
¶48  The alter-ego requirement and other technical problems with this case will come up 
in IT and IP theft cases where there are independent domestic producers or sellers acting 
on behalf of foreign or nonresident defendants. For jurisdiction purposes, the domestic 
seller and the foreign entity ought to be seen as part of the single supply chain, thus 
facilitating service of process. Instead, the court found that since the target of the 
investigation was outside the United States and had insufficient minimum contacts in the 
United States, service on the domestic entity was not service on the foreign entity.99  
These jurisdictional issues are not easily resolved (if they can be resolved at all), and are 
present in many of the state-initiated cases.100 
2. Illinois  
¶49  In 2012, Chunlai Yang, a former employee of Chicago-based CME Group, pled 
guilty to “two counts of theft of trade secrets for stealing source code and other 
proprietary information while at the same time pursuing plans to improve an electronic 
trading exchange in China.”101 Yang, a senior software engineer,102 admitted to 
downloading more than 10,000 of the company’s files, including the source code for the 
Globex electronic trading platform.103 It is estimated that the company lost up to $100 
million as a result of the theft.104 Yang stole the files by downloading them to flash drives 
and copying the files to his personal computers at home.105 The defendant’s purpose “was 
to increase the trading volume at the Zhangjiagang, China, chemical electronic trading 
 
97 Id. at 1052, 1058. 
98 Id. at 1066. 
99 See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales 
de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–18 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 
U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 
U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)); Joel R. Paul, Comity in 
International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 76–77 (1991).  
100 See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (citations 
omitted) (“A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or foreign-country) [defendants] 
when their affiliations with the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at 
home in the forum State. Specific jurisdiction . . . depends on an ‘affiliation between the forum and the 
underlying controversy,’ principally, activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State. . . .  
[S]pecific jurisdiction is confined to adjudication of ‘issues deriving from, or connected with, the very 
controversy that establishes jurisdiction.’”); J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 
(2011). 
101 DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF MAJOR U.S. EXPORT ENFORCEMENT, ECONOMIC ESPIONAGE, TRADE 
SECRET AND EMBARGO-RELATED CRIMINAL CASES 1, 9–10 (2014); see Indictment at 6, United States v. 
Chunlai Yang, No. 11 CR 458 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
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exchange (the Zhangjiagang Exchange).”106 Attempts to settle the case were ultimately 
successful,107 and Yang will serve time in prison for this theft.108   
3. Massachusetts 
¶50  In 2012, Massachusetts initiated an action against a Thai seafood distributor, 
Narong, alleging theft of IP covered under the state’s unfair competition law.109 This was 
the first of the new wave of state-initiated IP or IT piracy/theft/misappropriation cases 
brought by a state attorney general.110 Massachusetts alleged that Narong’s failure to pay 
licensing fees for the software used to produce and sell its products was a violation of the 
state unfair competition law.111 The attorney general noted that users of unlicensed 
software gain an unfair advantage over businesses that follow the rules.112 The action 
resulted in an agreement in which “Narong . . . agreed not to illegally use unlicensed 
copyrighted software programs in connection with the production or manufacturing of 
goods that enter Massachusetts.”113 Narong will also pay a $10,000 civil penalty.114   
4. New Jersey 
¶51  a) United States v. Maniar.115—In June 2013, Epstein Becker Green, on behalf of 
Becton, Dickinson & Company (BD), filed a civil action in New Jersey against former 
BD employee, Ketankumar Maniar.116 This lawsuit led to a restraining order against 
Maniar preventing him from leaving the country with trade secret information obtained 
from BD.117 This action has drawn the attention of federal law enforcement after it was 
alleged that Maniar had developed a “tool-kit” to manufacture an unreleased, prefilled 
 
106 Id. 
107 See Plea Agreement, United States v. Chunlai Yang, No. 11 CR 458 (N.D. Ill. 2012), available at  
http://www.justice.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2012/pr0919_01a.pdf. 
108 Andrew Harris, Ex-CME Software Engineer Admits to Trade-Secrets Theft, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 19, 
2012, 3:40 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-19/ex-cme-group-software-engineer-admits-
secrets-theft-u-s-says.html. 
109 Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Mass., supra note 78; see Assurance of Discontinuance Pursuant to G.L. 
c. 93A, §5 ¶ 5, Commonwealth v. Narong Seafood Co., No. 12-3825A (Mass. Dist. Ct. 2012); see also 
Michael B. Farrell, Massachusetts Fines Thai Seafood Company over Pirated Software, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 
19, 2012), http://bostonglobe.com/business/2012/10/18/massachusetts-fines-thai-seafood-company-over-
pirated-software/ZdfHGXTTSVMzlI0pQLcnhP/story.html; Ira Kantor, Thai Seafood Company to Pay 
$10G Penalty over Unfair Practices, BOS. HERALD (Oct. 18, 2012), http://bostonherald.com/business/ 
technology/technology_news/2012/10/thai_seafood_company_pay_10g_penalty_over_unfair; Patricia 
Resende, State Fines Thai Company for Pirated Software Use, BOS. BUS. J. (Oct. 18, 2012), http://www. 
masshightech.com/stories/2012/10/15/daily46-State-fines-Thai-company-for-pirated-software-use.html. 
110 See Farrell, supra note 109; see also Kantor, supra note 109; Resende, supra note 109. 
111 See Resende, supra note 109. 
112 See Press Release, Att’y Gen. of Mass., supra note 78. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. 
115 Former Engineer at Two Global Medical Technology Corporations Admits Theft of Trade Secrets, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 28, 2014), http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2014/former-
engineer-at-two-global-medical-technology-corporations-admits-theft-of-trade-secrets. 
116 James P. Flynn, Federal Trade Secret Enforcement Initiative Results in Swift Action, LEXOLOGY 
(June 10, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5f38fab7-acd1-41c6-8f99-27f530835855.  
117 Id. 
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pen injector made by BD in contravention of the Economic Espionage Act (EEA).118 
Both the state civil action and federal criminal case are pending.119 
¶52  b) United States v. Liu.—In March 2013, Sixing “Steve” Liu, a Chinese national, 
was sentenced to seventy months in prison for export control and other violations.120 
Liu’s convictions were for violating the EEA, the International Traffic in Arms 
Regulations, and the Arms Export Control Act.121 Liu stole thousands of electronic files 
from his New Jersey-based employer, the Space and Navigation Division of L-3 
Communications Holdings, Inc.122 This information included details about “the 
performance and design of guidance systems for missiles, rockets, target locators, and 
unmanned aerial vehicles.”123 Liu took the stolen files to China and delivered 
presentations about the technology at several Chinese universities.124 Liu used the stolen 
information to gain employment at a premier Chinese aeronautical institute.125 The 
question of whether Liu will be required to pay restitution is pending.126   
¶53  c) United States v. Li.—In January 2012, Yuan Li, a former research scientist for 
Sanofi Aventis, pled guilty to violating the EEA127 and was sentenced to eighteen months 
in prison.128 Li, a Chinese national, admitted to stealing data regarding chemical 
structures and sending that information via email or through use of a thumb drive.129 Li 
was required to pay $131,000 to Sanofi as restitution.130 
5. New York  
¶54  United States v. Agrawal, decided in August 2013, affirmed a conviction for an 
EEA and a National Stolen Property Act (NSPA) violation against Samarth Agrawal, a 
former employee of the French bank, Societe Generale (SocGen).131 Agrawal had access 
 
118 Id.; see Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012). 
119 Flynn, supra note 116; see Former Engineer for Global Medical Technology Corporation Charged 
with Stealing Trade Secrets from New Jersey Employer, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.fbi.gov/newark/press-releases/2013/former-engineer-for-global-medical-technology-
corporation-charged-with-stealing-trade-secrets-from-new-jersey-employer.  
120 Eric Carlson et al., Chinese National Sentenced to Nearly Six Years in Prison for Illegally Exporting 
U.S. Military Technology, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 31, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx? 
g=69702201-3034-480a-83fc-cb172ed7fb72.  
121 Id.; see Verdict Form, United States v. Liu, No. 11-208, 2012 WL 4378706 (D.N.J. Sept. 26, 2012). 
See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831–39 (2012); International Traffic in Arms 
Regulation, 22 C.F.R. §§ 120–30 (2013). 
122 Carlson et al., supra note 120; see Verdict Form, supra note 121. See generally 22 U.S.C. § 2778. 
123 Carlson et al., supra note 120; see Verdict Form, supra note 121. 
124 Carlson et al., supra note 120; see Verdict Form, supra note 121. 




127 Justin K. Beyer, Trade Secret Theft Prosecution Cases in the News, LEXOLOGY (May 16, 2012), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=cd8f1d10-66b9-431c-bf25-5b6a9c2ed047; Press Release, 
Dist. of N. J., U.S. Att’y’s Office, Former Research Chemist at Global Pharmaceutical Company Sentenced 
to 18 Months in Prison for Theft of Trade Secrets (May 7, 2012), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nj/Press/files/Li,%20Yuan%20Sentencing%20News%20Release.html. 
128 Beyer, supra note 127. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 United States v. Agrawal, 726 F.3d 235, 237 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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to confidential computer codes used to conduct securities trades.132 Agrawal printed these 
codes and took them to his home in New Jersey to copy SocGen’s trading system for a 
competitor.133 The issue on appeal was not whether Agrawal was a thief, but whether he 
was properly convicted under the EEA and NSPA.134   
¶55  Agrawal argued that in light of the recent decision in United States v. Aleynikov¸135 
the government had to show that the stolen codes were “included in SocGen’s HFT 
systems . . . [and] produced for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce as required by 
the EEA.”136 Although it was arguable that the codes were “valuable only in relation to 
the securities whose interstate trades it facilitated,”137 the government met the “produced 
for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce” requirement and the conviction was 
affirmed.138 
6. Utah 
¶56  In 2012, a chemist from Frontier Scientist Inc., pled guilty to “one count of 
unlawful access to a protected computer.”139 The defendant unlawfully accessed Frontier 
Scientist Inc.’s chemical-resource notebook and emailed information regarding chemical 
formulas to his brother-in-law, who lived in India.140 On review, however, the court 
dismissed the case.141 The judge determined that the “‘secret’ chemical recipe was not 
only widely known to professionals in the field, but inferior in some respects.”142 The 
court held that the defendant had served an appropriate amount of time, thirty days, for 
the unlawful use of the company’s computers.143   
7. Virginia   
¶57  One of the more recent cases in this field involves Kolon Industries.144 Kolon, a 
South Korean company, was indicted in Virginia for allegedly attempting to steal trade 
secrets regarding DuPont’s Kevlar para-aramid fiber.145 The indictment sought at least 
$225 million from the trade secret theft.146 Kolon produces Heracon, similar to Kevlar 
 
132 Id. at 238.  
133 Id. at 239. 
134 Id. at 237.  
135 United States v. Aleynikov, 676 F.3d 71, 73 (2d Cir. 2012) (reversing EEA and NSPA convictions on 
grounds of legal insufficiency when the government failed to demonstrate that the stolen IP was “produced 
for or placed in interstate or foreign commerce”). 
136 Agrawal, 726 F.3d at 242 (citations omitted). 
137 Id. at 248. 
138 Id. at 262. 
139 Beyer, supra note 127. 
140 Id. 




144 United States v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 926 F. Supp. 2d 794 (E.D. Va. 2013). 
145 Indictment at 1, 10, Kolon Indus., 926 F. Supp. 2d 794 (No. 3:12-CR-137), available at 
http://tsi.brooklaw.edu/sites/tsi.brooklaw.edu/files/filings/united-states-v-kolon-industries-inc-et-
al/20120821kolon-indictment.pdf. 
146 Id. at 35. 
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and Twaron, which are products used to make body armor and fiber-optic cables.147  
Kevlar is made by DuPont.148 According to the indictment, Kolon hired current and 
former DuPont employees to assist with the theft.149   
¶58  Kolon argued that since this is a criminal case, the United States must serve 
personally either Kolon or an appropriate U.S. agent. The government attempted service 
through MLAT (Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty).150 Kolon countered that the MLAT 
simply does not encompass the procedure for securing service of process abroad in this 
case.151 The government claimed it had taken the steps necessary to perfect service of 
“process pursuant to the U.S.-Korea MLAT.”152 The case is fairly typical of enforcement 
actions involving foreign defendants (not domiciled in the United States).153 It is also 
indicative of the limitations on state enforcement in IP- and IT-theft cases.154 Like 
Panang, Kolon shows the substantial problems regarding jurisdiction and remedies.   
¶59  Separate from the indictment, DuPont successfully sued Kolon and won a $919 
million judgment.155 In August 2013, DuPont sought judicial assistance to enforce the 
judgment in New York and lost. The court found that in this instance Kolon was beyond 
its jurisdictional reach,156 highlighting again the difficulties victims of IP theft face in 
securing relief, even after winning a judgment on the merits. 
8. Washington   
¶60  Washington has been at the forefront of state efforts to prosecute IT and IP theft as 
unfair competition. In 2011, the state adopted a broad-ranging law “aimed at giving 
domestic businesses a remedy against overseas IP infringement.”157 “[The law] creates a 
new cause of action allowing private plaintiffs or the state attorney general to seek 
damages and injunctive relief against a manufacturer of products sold in  
 
147 Id. at 3. 
 148 Better, Stronger and Safer with Kevlar Fiber, DUPONT, http://www.dupont.com/products-and-
services/fabrics-fibers-nonwovens/fibers/brands/kevlar.html (last visited Sept. 6, 2014). 
149 Indictment at 8, Kolon Indus., 926 F. Supp. 2d 794 (No. 3:12-CR-137). 
150 See generally Mut. Legal Assistance Treaty, U.S.-U.K., Jan. 6, 1994, T.I.A.S. No. 96-1202, available 
at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/176269.pdf. 
151 Kolon Indus., 926 F. Supp. 2d at 817–18; see D.I. 37-1 at 8 (MLAT, Art. I § 3). 
152 Response in Opposition to Specially-Appearing Defendant Kolon Industries, Inc.’s Motion to Quash 
Service and to Dismiss the Superseding Indictment at 9, Kolon Indus., 926 F. Supp. 2d 794 (No. 3:12-CR-
137). 
153 Kolon Succeeds in Getting Its Trade Secret Theft Arraignment Postponed, SULLIVAN TRADE SECRETS 
(June 7, 2013), http://sullivantradesecrets.com/kolon-succeeds-in-getting-its-trade-secret-theft-indictment-
postponed/. 
154 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Industries, Inc. preceded the 2013 Kolon criminal 
proceeding (still underway). 894 F. Supp. 2d 691 (E.D. Va. 2012). In that 2012 civil case between DuPont 
and Kolon, DuPont sued Kolon, alleging that there was misappropriation of trade secrets, and Kolon 
counterclaimed, accusing DuPont of monopolization or attempting to monopolize the para-aramid fiber 
market. Id. at 691. The antitrust claim was dismissed for “failure to sufficiently plead a relevant 
geographical market.” Id. After the court of appeals reversed that decision, and after a jury trial on the 
merits, Kolon was found liable pursuant to the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act. Id. DuPont requested 
and was granted a permanent injunction. Id. at 694. 
155 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., No. 3:09cv58, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134821, at *3 
(E.D. Va. Nov. 22, 2011). 
156 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., 12 Civ. 8435 (AJN), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123949, 
at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 29, 2013). 
157 Shickich, supra note 73, at 3; see WASH. REV. CODE § 19.330.020 (2011). 
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Washington . . . .”158 While this offers businesses a way to protect their IP and IT, it does 
not resolve the challenges extant in cases against foreign companies. “Lax IP protections 
abroad result in limited legal remedies for IT license holders in the United States.”159 The 
presence of the law suggests that “it is possible that . . . foreign manufacturers will begin 
to bring their IT into compliance.”160 However, “it is also possible that some 
manufacturers will find alternatives to avoid prosecution, such as creating separate 
reselling companies to sell into the Washington market.”161  
¶61  Washington’s unfair competition law recently prompted the settlement of an IP 
theft claim asserted by Microsoft against Embraer; a foreign aircraft manufacturer that 
was allegedly misappropriating U.S.-owned and -protected software.162 The Embraer 
settlement represents the merger of public and private resources at the state level to 
secure protection of IP because the Washington State Attorney General worked with 
Embraer to bring its business practices into compliance with state law. The Office of the 
State Attorney General noted this was an effective use of the “state’s new unfair 
competition law to resolve a dispute over software licensing issues. . . . [The State] 
exchanged several letters with Embraer, the Brazilian company at the center of the 
dispute, in an effort to resolve the matter before taking more formal steps.”163 Sharing the 
steps taken to achieve this success and publishing widely the facts of the settlement 
would be of great value in the quest to mitigate IP and IT theft. A global partnership 
committed to this goal could achieve that objective far more easily than a state attorney 
general.      
9. Wisconsin   
¶62  In June 2013, a federal grand jury in Wisconsin indicted three individuals and 
Sinovel, Inc., a manufacturer and exporter of wind turbines in the People’s Republic of 
China, for “conspiracy to commit trade secret theft, theft of trade secrets, and wire 
fraud.”164 The indictment accused the defendants of “stealing technology from American 
Superconductor Corp. of Devens (AMSC).”165 Further, it noted that the defendants used 
stolen software taken from AMSC to make four of Sinovel’s wind turbines.166 The 
 
158 Shickich, supra note 73, at 3. 
159 Id. at 1, 6. 
160 Id. at 1, 26. 
161 Id. 
162 Press Release, Wash. State Office of the Att’y Gen., Washington’s New Unfair Competition Law 
Protects Local Company from Software Piracy (Apr. 3, 2013), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/ 
pressrelease.aspx?id=31143#.UmvisV_D-T8. 
163 Jessica M. Karmasek, Wash. AG: State’s New Unfair Competition Law Put to Use, LEGAL NEWSLINE 
(Apr. 4, 2013, 8:00 AM), http://legalnewsline.com/news/240591-wash-ag-states-new-unfair-competition-
law-put-to-use (pitting Microsoft against “Embraer, the world’s fourth largest aircraft manufacturer, 
[which] produces commercial, military and executive aircraft and provides other aeronautical services”). 
164 Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals Charged in Wisconsin with Theft of AMSC Trade Secrets, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 27, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/June/13-crm-730.html. 
165 Erin Ailworth, Theft Case Against Chinese Firm Carries a Warning, BOS. GLOBE (June 30, 2013), 
http://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2013/06/29/sinovel-case-could-protect-technology/SJzQJI96mTYw 
OH7LH9Ey2J/story.html; see also United States v. Sinovel Wind Grp. Co., No. 13-cr-00084 (W.D. Wis. 
2013); Michael Riley, China’s Sinovel Charged with Stealing Trade Secrets, BLOOMBERG (June 27, 2013), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-27/china-s-sinovel-charged-with-stealing-trade-secrets.html. 
166 Riley, supra note 165. 
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indictment also alleged that the defendants conspired to steal trade secrets and cheated 
AMSC out of more than $800 million.167 Sinovel also allegedly recruited an employee to 
leave AMSC, join Sinovel, and bring secretly copied IP from AMSC to Sinovel.168 
AMSC previously attempted to file suit against Sinovel in China, but Sinovel appealed 
those cases and the parties are awaiting resolution.169 Among the arguments in the case is 
the same “alter-ego” problem noted earlier in the California Pangang case.170 
B. Jurisdictional Challenges with Cybercrime 
¶63  The Department of Justice defines computer crimes as “any violation[] of criminal 
law that involve[s] a knowledge of computer technology for their perpetration, 
investigation, or prosecution.”171 The Department’s prosecution manual notes that while 
many statutes were created to impose punishment for domestic cybercrimes and to extend 
beyond U.S. borders, the statute must provide an “interstate or foreign jurisdictional 
hook.”172 The presence of the Internet alone could arguably satisfy this requirement due 
to its “inexorable connection” with interstate commerce,173 but that does not resolve the 
problems associated with securing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants.    
¶64  Most U.S. criminal laws do not have extraterritorial jurisdiction absent clear 
congressional intent.174 Importantly for IT and IP, domestic patent and copyright laws 
typically do not apply extraterritorially.175 Trademark protection under the Lanham Act176 
pertaining to extraterritorial misconduct by foreign defendants is possible only when 
conduct “has a substantial effect on United States commerce by way of importing goods 
into the United States.”177 Even if misconduct is found, foreign defendants may argue 
they are not subject to the lawsuit in that forum and seek dismissal based on forum non 
conveniens.178 And generally, no matter what statute is used to pursue trans-boundary IP 
or IT theft, extraterritorial application must be clear based on the plain meaning of the 
 
167 Sinovel Corporation and Three Individuals Charged in Wisconsin with Theft of AMSC Trade Secrets, 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 27, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/June/13-crm-730.html. 
168 Id. 
169 Ailworth, supra note 165. 
170 See supra notes 93–98 and accompanying text. 
171 Eric J. Bakewell et al., Computer Crimes, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 481, 483 (2001) (citing NAT’L INST. 
OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPUTER CRIME: CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESOURCE MANUAL 2 (1989)). 
172 COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING COMPUTER 
CRIMES 113 (4th ed. 2012); see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a) (prohibiting access-device fraud “if the offense 
affects interstate or foreign commerce”); 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (defining “electronic communication” to 
mean any “transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, sounds, data, or intelligence . . . that affects interstate 
or foreign commerce”). 
173 COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 172, at 113–14; see also United 
States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 952 (9th Cir. 2007) (noting, in context of prosecution under § 1028, that 
“it seems clear that use of the internet is intimately related to interstate commerce”). 
174 See COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, supra note 172, at 113; see also United 
States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211 (2d Cir. 2000); United States v. Cotton, 471 F.2d 744, 750 (9th Cir. 
1973). 
175 Robert Kantner, Protecting Trade Secrets Internationally Through a Comprehensive Trade Secret 
Policy: Trade Secret Is Increasing and the Need for a Protection Policy Is Unquestionable, 59 PRAC. LAW. 
17, 18 (2013). 
176 Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–141 (2012). 
177 Kantner, supra note 175, at 18. 
178 Id. 
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statute.179 As international law scholar Georges Delaume explained more than a half-
century ago: “[O]nce a statute is promulgated, it is irrelevant whether its scope is limited 
to the punishment of nationals or to that of foreigners . . . provided there cannot be any 
doubt as to the legislative intent.”180   
¶65  One enforcement path that unquestionably does apply to foreign defendants is to 
pursue a complaint of IP theft by filing a complaint with the ITC.181 This is a standard 
route for companies seeking legal recourse for loss of trade secrets by foreign 
defendants,182 particularly after the Federal Circuit’s decision in TianRui v. International 
Trade Commission and Amsted Industries.183 TianRui holds that under § 337 of the Tariff 
Act of 1930,184 ITC relief is available to a domestic victim of trade secret theft even if the 
misconduct took place outside of the United States.185   
¶66  In TianRui, a Chinese corporation stole trade secrets pertaining to the manufacture 
of cast-steel railway wheels.186 TianRui attempted to negotiate with U.S.-based Amstead 
Industries to gain licensing rights to the method, but when negotiations failed, TianRui 
hired nine of Amsted’s employees from its licensee, DACC, and using their knowledge 
of the product, produced wheels that were marketed and imported into the United 
States.187 Amsted subsequently filed a complaint with the ITC.   
¶67  TianRui sought to have the claim dismissed because the alleged trade secret 
misappropriation occurred in China,188 arguing that Congress did not intend § 337 to 
apply extraterritorially.189 However, the administrative law judge held the location of the 
misappropriation (China) was not the main issue in this case.190 Using Illinois state law, 
the judge determined that TianRui unlawfully appropriated 128 trade secrets.191  
¶68  On review, the court concluded that § 337 permits the ITC to apply state trade 
secret law to misconduct that took place in China. While there are some who believe that 
U.S. courts do not have the authority to address trade secret theft abroad,192 TianRui 
 
 179 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2873 (2010) (quoting EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil 
Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)) (“It is a ‘longstanding principle of American law that legislation of 
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States.’”); see Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc. v. Scorpio Music Distribs., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. 
Pa. 1983), aff’d mem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984) (“The protection afforded by the United States Code 
does not extend beyond the borders of this country unless the Code expressly states.”). 
180 Blakesley, supra note 47, at 11 (emphasis added) (quoting Georges R. Delaume, Jurisdiction over 
Crimes Committed Abroad: French and American Law, 21 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 173, 181 (1952–53)). 
181 U.S. INT’L TRADE COMM’N, http://www.usitc.gov/ (last visited Sept. 6, 2014).  
182 See Viki Economides, Comment, TianRui Group Co. v. International Trade Commission: The 
Dubious Status of Extraterritoriality and the Domestic Industry Requirement of Section 337, 61 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1235 (2011) (discussing the limits of extraterritoriality under § 337). 
183 TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
184 Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, § 337, 46 Stat. 590 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. § 1337 
(2006)). 
185 TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1325; see Steven E. Feldman & Sherry L. Rollo, Extraterritorial 
Protection of Trade Secret Rights in China: Do Section 337 Actions at the ITC Really Prevent Trade Secret 
Theft Abroad?, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 523, 525 (2012). 
186 TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1325. 
187 Id. at 1324. 
188 Id. at 1329. 
189 Id. at 1325; Feldman, supra note 185, at 530. 
190 TianRui Grp. Co., 661 F.3d at 1325. 
191 Id. 
192 Economides, supra note 182, at 1243. 
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reflects the importance of finding viable domestic routes to protect IP and IT, particularly 
when such protection is difficult or impossible to find in foreign courts and agencies.  
¶69  TianRui notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s policy regarding extraterritoriality is 
fairly clear: “When a statute gives no clear indication of extraterritorial application, it has 
none.”193 Even the requirement of establishing impact on a “domestic industry” 
component can be problematic. In John Mezzalingua Associates, Inc. v. International 
Trade Commission,194 PPC, a coaxial-cable connectors manufacturer, filed a § 337 
complaint with the ITC claiming the imported coaxial-cable connectors infringed on its 
patent design.195 The ITC held that PPC had “failed to satisfy the ‘domestic industry’ 
requirement and PPC appealed.”196 Section 337 requires a “domestic industry,” which in 
turn includes “(a) significant investment in plant and equipment; (b) significant 
employment or labor or capital; or (c) substantial investment in its exploitation, including 
engineering, research and development, or licensing.”197   
¶70  If careful to stay foreign, foreign companies that steal IP and IT benefit from the 
historic reluctance of American courts to reach beyond U.S. borders, notwithstanding the 
limited ITC process.198     
C. Federal Initiatives 
¶71  There are those who take the position that federal cases, certainly those mentioned 
above and brought pursuant to § 337 of the Tariff Act, “should be decided under a 
uniform federal standard, rather than by reference to a particular state’s tort law.”199 This 
raises the question of whether federal law is a more viable option for pursuing foreign 
defendants than state law.   
¶72  While the federal government has not given highest priority to the problem of IT 
and IP theft, there are indications of a renewed and meaningful commitment to 
addressing this problem, most notably the creation of the Office of the Intellectual 
Property Enforcement Coordinator and the Interagency Trade Enforcement Center.200   
¶73  One federal agency, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), has the authority to 
address unfair competition,201 but despite a direct request from the National Association 
of Attorneys General urging the FTC to act, has failed to take significant enforcement 
 
193 Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010)). 
194 660 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
195 Gregory J. Spak et al., A Review of Recent Decisions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit Area Summary: 2011 International Trade Law Decisions of the Federal Circuit, 61 AM.  U. 
L. REV. 1105, 1142 (2012) (citing John Mezzalingua Assocs., 660 F.3d 1322). 
196 Spak et al., supra note 195, at 1143 (quoting John Mezzalingua Assocs., 660 F.3d at 1324).  
197 Id. (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1137(a)(3) (2006)).  
198 See, e.g., J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011); Goodyear Dunlop Tires 
Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011); Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 480 
U.S. 102, 113 (1987); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415–18 (1984); 
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 294 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 
253 (1958); Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
199 TianRui Grp. Co. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 661 F.3d 1322, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
200 Ezell, supra note 17. 
201 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A) (2006) (allowing FTC to seek civil penalties from a company or person 
violating any such rule “with actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective 
circumstances that such act is unfair or deceptive and is prohibited by such rule”). 
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action combatting the use of stolen IP and IT.202 FTC jurisdiction includes actions 
committed abroad that have a “direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect” on 
domestic commerce at home.203 Although the agency declined to act, Chairman Jon 
Leibowitz did issue a reply stating that the FTC is “deeply committed to exploring issues 
at the intersection of competition and intellectual property,” and that the FTC is “always 
on the lookout for ways to use our broad . . . enforcement authority judiciously, yet 
effectively, to combat unfair methods of competition . . . within the scope of [its] 
jurisdiction . . . .”204 It is hard to see how a pattern and practice of theft of IP and IT 
abroad causing billions of dollars in domestic losses and distorting the price of vast 
quantities of goods sold in the United States does not qualify as an unfair method of 
competition. 
¶74  The Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property released a report 
in May 2013 proposing changes to U.S. policy to prevent China’s appropriation of U.S. 
intellectual property.205 The report recommended the FTC “obtain meaningful sanctions 
against foreign companies using stolen IP.”206 It remains to be seen whether this 
recommendation will prompt the FTC to take action. 
¶75  Beyond the FTC, Stephen Ezell, an IT commentator with the Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation, suggests that the United States needs to make 
apparent that systematic theft of U.S. IP will have consequences.207 “[T]he Secretary of 
the Treasury should be empowered to deny the use of the American Banking system to 
foreign companies that repeatedly use or benefit from the theft of American IP, even if 
Wall Street objects.”208 He also suggests more of a focus on major offenders, including 
China, and amendments to the Economic Espionage Act to create “a federal right of 
action for trade-secret theft.”209 Ezell also urges granting customs officials greater 
authority to impound at the border exports they suspect have benefitted from IP theft.210   
¶76  Part of the federal interest in this field lies in the direct linkage between IP and IT 
theft and national security. Section 833 of the 2013 National Defense Authorization Act 
(NDAA)211 addresses IP and IT counterfeiting with the goal of keeping pirated products 
out of the supply chain for goods available or sold in the United States. Counterfeiting, 
 
202 Letter from the Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. to the FTC (Nov. 4, 2011), available at 
http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/FTCA percent20Enforcement percent20Final.PDF. 
203 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(3)(A)(i)(ii) (2006) (“This subsection shall not apply to unfair methods of 
competition involving commerce with foreign nations (other than import commerce) unless—(A) such 
methods of competition have a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect . . . .”); see Michael A. 
Rabkin, When Consumer Fraud Crosses the International Line: The Basis for Extraterritorial Jurisdiction 
Under the FTC Act, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 294, 296 (2007); see also Richard W. Beckler & Matthew H. 
Kirtland, Extraterritorial Application of US Antitrust Law: What Is a “Direct, Substantial, and Reasonably 
Foreseeable Effect” Under the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act?, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 11 (2003) 
(reviewing the “effects” test as it applies, inter alia, to the FTC). 
204 Grant Gross, Update: Senators Press FTC to Begin Investigating Software Piracy, CFO WORLD 
(Apr. 3, 2012), http://www.cfoworld.com/technology/35677/update-senators-press-ftc-begin-investigating-
software-piracy. 
205 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 14.  
206 Id. at 6. 
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like all forms of IP and IT theft, undermines critical forces in the U.S. economy, lessens 
incentives for product and service improvement, decreases interest in investment in U.S. 
initiative and innovation, and can compromise national security.212 The Department of 
Defense has recognized that pirated or reverse-engineered copies function less reliably 
and can be “programmed with hidden spyware or backdoors for espionage.”213 These 
concerns are also evident “in-house,” as noted in the IP Commission Report mentioned 
earlier,214 which discussed the discovery of 1,800 counterfeit electronic components 
within the supply chain of the U.S. Department of Defense.215 
¶77  Beyond the NDAA, the Economic Espionage Act (EEA)216 criminalizes certain 
trade secret theft217 and allows the “U.S. Attorney General to initiate civil public 
enforcement proceedings.”218 The EEA applies only to a “U.S. citizen or permanent 
resident alien or an organization organized under U.S. law, or if an act in furtherance of 
the offense was committed in the United States.”219 This limits EEA enforcement and can 
preclude its use for many types of IT and IP theft in global supply chains that harm U.S. 
interests but take place beyond the border.220 However, there is a general argument that 
foreign defendants engaged in a conspiracy with domestic co-conspirators located in the 
United States are within the jurisdictional reach of the courts,221 limiting enforcement to 
those instances where (a) the restrictive requirements of the Act are met and (b) a federal 
agency exercises its discretion to initiate an enforcement action.    
¶78  Naturally, the overall picture of federal interests requires consideration of U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).222 ICE leads the National Intellectual 
Property Rights Coordination Center (IPR Center),223 and “stands at the forefront of the 
U.S. Government’s response to global intellectual property theft.”224 Although ICE, the 
Department of Justice, and the FBI have considerable authority under the EEA to deal 
with IP and IT theft, United States v. Aleynikov, mentioned earlier,225 illustrates important 
limitations on federal prosecution.226 Aleynikov, a former employee of Goldman Sachs & 
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e.g., Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Research Int’l, 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., 
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Co., was convicted of “stealing and transferring some of the proprietary computer source 
code used in his employer’s high frequency trading system, in violation of the National 
Stolen Property Act227 . . . and the Economic Espionage Act.”228 Aleynikov appealed, 
claiming the product was not “produced for or placed in interstate or foreign  
commerce.”229 The court agreed and reversed the lower court’s decision.230   
¶79  Reacting to this decision, Congress passed the Theft of Trade Secrets Clarification 
Act of 2012, replacing “a product that is produced for or placed in interstate or foreign 
commerce,” with “a product or service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign 
commerce.”231 Congress followed with the Foreign and Economic Penalty Enhancement 
Act of 2012,232 increasing the penalties in trade secret cases for those who “knowingly 
commit economic espionage to benefit a non-U.S. government, agency  
or instrumentality.”233 The fine was increased from $500,000 to $5,000,000234 for 
individuals, and from $10,000,000 to “the greater of $10,000,000 or 3 times the value of 
the stolen trade secret”235 for organizations. The Act also charges the United States 
Sentencing Commission to evaluate, when appropriate, “amending the federal sentencing 
guidelines for foreign trade secret theft convictions.”236   
¶80  Thus far, the new language in the EEA has led to a few prosecutions, though the 
number and nature of the cases are unlikely to change the IP- and IT-theft landscape.237 
The small number and infrequency of these cases is a testament to their cost,238 
complexity, and limited range. That is not to diminish their importance, but rather, to 
observe that federal or state efforts alone will not achieve the desired result of cutting or 
eliminating IP and IT theft. 
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D. International Efforts  
¶81  An Intellectual Property Commission Report released in May 2013 began with a 
general discussion of the continuing problem of IP and IT theft globally, raising the 
challenge of federal short-term measures and the possibility of legal reforms.239 In some 
of the countries where threats to IP and IT are greatest, there is little evidence of a culture 
of compliance.240 In those countries, “[j]udicial resources are either not utilized or lack 
the capacity or experience to hear cases.”241 Likewise, there are few criminal sanctions 
for IP and IT pirates in several countries where the violations are rife.242   
¶82  The two most populous nations in the world, India and China, appear to have 
inefficient judicial institutions and seldom impose sufficient criminal sentences to deter 
IP theft.243 In China, the courts are overwhelmed with cases, and judges with jurisdiction 
over IP cases are spread thin.244 Barriers to service of process, discovery, and meaningful 
remedies in both countries remain a vexing problem for U.S. parties seeking redress, both 
there and in U.S. courts.245 Despite improvements in some sectors following China’s 
2010 Special IPR Enforcement Campaign,246 China remained on the “priority watch list” 
published by the United States Trade Representative (USTR)247 in 2012 and 2013.248    
¶83  A Business Software Alliance (BSA) study denotes software piracy as a vast and 
dangerous international problem,249 which is likely to continue to grow because 
“emerging economies, which in recent years have been the driving force behind PC 
software piracy, are now decisively outpacing mature markets in their growth rate.”250 In 
2011, emerging economies “account[ed] for more than half of all PCs in use.”251   
¶84  Given the nature of the problem, it is worth asking whether the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS),252 the primary 
multilateral agreement in the field, provides reliable resolution of trans-boundary IP and 
IT theft. All World Trade Organization (WTO) members are party to TRIPS, which sets 
out rules for copyrighted materials, trademarks, geographic indications (e.g., for region-
specific wine or cheese), industrial design, patents, and other IP and IT interests.253   
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¶85  TRIPS requires state parties to develop enforcement procedures with meaningful 
remedies, including injunctions and other measures, to sanction violators and deter 
further infringement.254 The agreement allows only for those damages necessary to 
compensate the injury caused by the infringement plus the possibility of legal costs.255 It 
also requires state parties to “provide for criminal procedures and penalties to be applied 
at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale.”256   
¶86  TRIPS is written to accommodate new signatories, and delays the start of state 
obligations for one year after entry into the WTO.257 It gives developing countries or 
countries transitioning from a centrally planned economy into a free-enterprise economy 
a compliance delay of four years after securing WTO membership.258 The compliance 
delay extends to five years if there is a need to develop and implement protections for 
patentable goods, assuming such provisions were not in place prior to entering the 
WTO.259 The delay extends to ten years for members that qualify as least-developed 
countries.260 TRIPS requires developed countries to provide incentives to new 
developing-country members to facilitate both IP protection and technology transfer.261  
These delayed enforcement provisions raise legitimate questions about the resolve 
reflected in TRIPS and the value or merit of WTO sanctions.262   
¶87  The 2011 Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)263 has a more declarative 
text but, as critics have pointed out, the negotiation process underlying its use and 
implementation lacks transparency.264 Add to this the general lack of trade secrets 
protection in many countries where trade secrets “are either not at all, or are inadequately, 
protected,”265 and one gets a sense of the incomplete nature of both ACTA and TRIPS. 
Accordingly, “Once a trade secret is made public, it enters the public domain.  Invariably 
it will be lost permanently and, in most instances, so will the competitive advantage 
linked to it.”266 Based on recent surveys, this hazard is particularly pronounced in China, 
Pakistan, Russia, and India.267  
¶88  China, a signatory to a number of the aforementioned agreements, accounts “for 50 
to 80 percent globally” of IT and IP theft.268 IP protection in India has also raised 
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questions about the value and success of multilateral agreements.269 Among other things, 
India’s Ministry of Commerce’s Technology Import and Export Regulations appear to 
vest something resembling IP ownership in an employee who plays a central role in its 
development.270 Under this interpretation, improvements to technology downstream the 
supply chain are difficult to protect and the overall IP-rights formulation becomes murky 
at best. 
¶89  In the European Union (EU), IP infringement can be pursued through Article 
7(1)(b) of Directive 2009/24/EC on the legal protection of computer programs.271 The 
Directive obligates member states to “provide . . . appropriate remedies against a person 
committing [an] act of . . . the possession, for commercial purposes, of a copy of a 
computer program knowing, or having reason to believe, that it is an infringing copy.”272 
The EU recognizes the importance of IP theft, and the Council Resolution on the  
EU Customs Action Plan sets out a plan to dedicate 2013–2017 to tackling IP 
infringement.273   
¶90  In sum, the EU commonly adopts multinational approaches to combat trade-related 
issues. Further, a number of countries, including the United States,274 have enacted or are 
in the process of implementing similar measures specifying that government ministries 
may only use legitimate software.275  
E. Private Efforts 
¶91  Beyond state, federal, and international regimes to protect IP and IT, there are 
various private entities playing a role in this fight. Each of these companies or services 
described below, like all of the state, federal, and multinational legal enforcement 
mechanisms discussed earlier, address the reality of 21st century business: success in 
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almost any field requires disclosure of valuable IP and IT. For knowledge-based 
outsourcing involving specialized domain expertise, the company is invariably required 
“to disclose and share knowledge-intensive processes with the offshore provider, which 
knowledge may be in the form of proprietary technology, software, chemical entities, 
specifications, product designs, business processes, methodologies, drug formulations or 
other sensitive data.”276 In light of this, companies should make efforts to retain control 
over daily operations within the supply chain and protect intellectual property, though, 
significant risks will inevitably remain.277  
¶92   Most supply chains rely on third-party sourcing, and that often means 
relinquishing control, thus exposing proprietary IP and IT. In one case, a Chinese 
electronics manufacturer paid an employee of Apple-supplier Foxconn approximately 
$3,000 for information and images of the iPad 2, so that it could make protective cases 
for the iPad 2 several months before the product’s release.278 The value of the R&D 
connected with the stolen trade secret is estimated to be worth 100 times more than the 
money the employee received.279 In this instance, the employee was caught, tried, and 
incarcerated in China.280 
¶93  Private employers not only must implement internal policies to prevent IP theft, but 
can also pursue a private cause of action under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA)281 against former employees who have stolen trade secrets from company 
computers.282 This remedy is somewhat limited, particularly after the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision in United States v. Nosal.283 The court in Nosal held that “an employee could not 
be liable under the CFAA for ‘exceeding authorized access’ to an employer’s computer 
by accessing proprietary information in violation of the employer’s written computer use 
policies.”284 In Nosal, a former employee “allegedly convinced several former colleagues 
to download and transmit lists of executives so that he could compete with this former 
employer.”285 The court found, “[The CFAA] prohibits improper ‘access’ of computer 
information. It does not prohibit misuse or misappropriation.”286 In addition, the Fourth 
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Circuit adopted a similar stance in WEC Carolina Energy Solutions LLC v. Miller, which 
mirrors the court’s reasoning in Nosal.287   
¶94  Rather than providing a needed remedy for IP-theft victims, Nosal expresses 
concern about criminalizing innocuous activity.288 This case is troubling for those 
attempting to address theft of trade secrets since the court found the CFAA to be almost 
solely an anti-hacking statute, not one designed to address misappropriation of trade 
secrets or other forms of IP and IT theft. The statute’s general purpose, the court noted, is 
“to punish hacking—the circumvention of technological access barriers—not 
misappropriation of trade secrets.”289 This perverse interpretation of the CFAA, coupled 
with jurisdictional limitations and weak enforcement regimes, underscores the 
importance of alternative or nongovernmental measures to protect IP and IT.  
¶95  Given the scattered and unreliable remedial potential of Article III Courts, private 
organizations have emerged to help IP owners protect their property. FACT, a private 
company based in Great Britain, is set up exclusively to combat piracy of intellectual 
property.290 Under the FACT Certification Scheme, which currently covers over 110 
companies, businesses “must satisfy members they have sufficiently high levels of 
security in order to safeguard the intellectual property rights of FACT members.”291 
FACT represents entities in the “film, television, technology and sports rights 
industries.”292   
¶96  In the United States, Verafirm provides a certification system designed to 
communicate that an IP user is legal, licensed, and not engaging in IP theft. Verafirm 
certification is a “first step in demonstrating that your company is transparent, well-run, 
and respects intellectual property.”293 Verafirm’s system has varying levels of 
certification, each designed to indicate increasing levels of scrutiny and protection of IP 
and IT.294  
¶97  The Global Intellectual Property Center has developed a manual to assist 
businesses in protecting their intellectual property from misappropriation.295 The Center 
warns: “Counterfeiters prey on companies with lax security measures and porous supply 
chains . . . counterfeiters have an uncanny ability to detect weaknesses in a brand owner’s 
supply chain and frequently point to those weaknesses when accused of 
counterfeiting.”296 The Center functions as an advocacy body within the Chamber of 
Commerce and does not have enforcement power.297 
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¶98  The Center for Responsible Enterprise and Trade (CREATE.org)298 works with 
multinational corporations to improve business practices in global supply chains while 
protecting intellectual property rights.299 CREATE.org offers “best practices”300 for the 
industry and government procurement officials to help detect counterfeiting and ensure 
product safety.301  
¶99  The Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) is a partnership between the U.S. 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National White Collar Crime Center 
(NW3C).302 NW3C provides nationwide support systems for law enforcement and 
regulatory agencies involved in the prevention, investigation, and prosecution of 
economic and high-tech crime.303 The IC3 was renamed in October 2003 to reflect both 
its reach into Internet abuse and cybercrime, and its mission to receive, develop, and refer 
criminal cybercrime complaints. After ten years, although there have been some victories, 
IC3 has not made a meaningful dent in the range and frequency of IT and IP theft.   
¶100  The massive impact of IP and IT theft described at the outset of this Article stands 
as a testament to the insufficiency of existing measures. It is not that any one of the above 
entities or the legal remedies discussed earlier is without merit; it is that each entity acts 
in isolation.304 Further, it is next to impossible to stop IT and IP theft in a world where 
huge segments of the population do not view unauthorized file-sharing, downloading 
critical information to a thumb drive, or other nearly invisible acts of piracy as criminal 
or even wrongful.  
¶101  Successful case-by-case enforcement deterring large numbers of people from 
piracy is impossible in a world that has not fully bought into the simple, underlying 
premise that stealing IP and IT in any form is wrong. When Chinese and U.S. college 
students, along with technology workers in India and Indiana, simply do not accept that 
IT and IP theft is wrong, and believe it is, at worst, a victimless crime, the probability of a 
substantial reduction in theft brought on by fear of enforcement is very low.305   
¶102  It may be, in the end, that this set of problems will only abate when public attitudes 
about IP and IT theft begin to shift. There are some signs that as a matter of personal 
 
 298 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, http://www.create.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
 299 See DARREL M. WEST, TWELVE WAYS TO BUILD TRUST IN THE ICT GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAIN 10 
(2013).  
 300 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS, supra note 55, at 18–19. 
 301 The Center for Responsible Enterprise & Trade’s goals are to 1) insure greater traceability in the 
supply chain, 2) foster greater cooperation, coordination, and accountability among all participants, 3) 
increase information sharing to strengthen supply-chain integrity, 4) include provisions in supplier 
contracts that facilitate and improve oversight, 5) calibrate supplier assessments according to risk level, 6) 
engage proactively with suppliers on an ongoing basis, 7) ensure that supplier requirements flow down to 
subcontractors, 8) develop procedures for reporting on and ensuring destruction of counterfeit parts, 9) 
work collaboratively with government authorities to support product safety and quality, and 10) increase 
awareness among consumers and end users about the hazards of counterfeits. Id. at 18–19.  
 302 See INTERNET CRIME COMPLAINT CTR., http://www.ic3.gov/default.aspx (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
 303 See id. 
 304 Trevor T. Moores, An Analysis of the Impact of Economic Wealth and National Culture on the Rise 
and Fall of Software Piracy Rates, 81 J. OF BUS. ETHICS 39, 47 (2008) (discussing how the certainty of 
punishment reduces the probability of piracy). 
 305 See George E. Higgins, Abby L. Wilson, & Brian D. Fell, An Application of Deterrence Theory to 
Software Piracy, 12(3) J. CRIM. JUSTICE & POPULAR CULTURE 166, 178–79 (2005) (“[W]e believe there is 
a culture that thinks software piracy is proper behavior, but if educational institutions can change this 
climate to emphasize the criminogenic issues surrounding software piracy, then the behavior may be 
reduced.”). 
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ethics, consumers value the IP and IT integrity of the companies and entities with whom 
they deal.306 That belief structure is obviously not adopted as a universal and fundamental 
value. Without that shared understanding, vulnerabilities not only continue—they 
increase.  
¶103  Taken together, the mechanisms discussed thus far can go a long way in protecting 
IP and IT. Governments and private actors are and should be increasingly focused on 
preventing trade secret theft through industrial and economic espionage, as well as cyber 
espionage.307 Companies need effective compliance programs to manage IP risks. Yet 
notwithstanding these well-known financial repercussions, businesses often neglect to 
properly allocate adequate resources to such programs. For instance, in many companies, 
compliance programs for anticorruption are more developed than those for IP 
protection.308 
IV. THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF A PUBLIC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR PARTNERSHIP  
¶104  Given the magnitude of the problem in the United States, one would think that all 
branches of government and all businesses with IP exposure would be engaged, 
strategizing on ways to combat the IP and IT theft that drains hundreds of billions in 
value, however calculated, every year. That assumption, however, is not entirely correct. 
Many governmental entities, such as the FTC, have not entered the fray.   
¶105  As to private-sector actors, a recent study by Setec, Inc., an independent provider of 
vendor-neutral information-security solutions, noted: 
With 70 percent of the world’s intellectual property within the United 
States, US-based companies continue to dedicate extensive resources to 
research and development . . . . [But recent studies] demonstrate that over 
one-third of surveyed Fortune 2000 and middle-market companies have no 
 
 306 See Why Are Americans Afraid of China?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 5, 2013), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=188919258. Bruce Pickering of the Asia Society 
stated: 
 
[T]here are sometimes competing priorities because the American consumer, on the 
one hand, wants inexpensive products. That’s why the Chinese have, you know, so 
much of our trading has been with China is that they’ve been able to produce so many 
products Americans want comparatively inexpensively. And there is a concern, I think, 
on the part of companies that also, though, the American consumer doesn’t just simply 
want products without any kind of ethical, you know, handling. And the more they 
know, of course, the more likely people are to make educated choices. So I think, when 
operating in Asia, given a choice, Americans would like to get low-cost products with 
ethical, you know, kind of ethical sourcing. And when information comes out, they 
tend to make decisions, I think, that move away from, you know, kind of workplace 
conditions that are inhuman or at least not very nice. 
 
Id. 
 307 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5, at 39. 
308 See BAYER, supra note 16, at 30–36.  
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formal program for safeguarding intellectual property and spend less than 
5% of their budgets on security.309    
¶106  The absence of thorough public or governmental protection and limits on private 
action produce a vacuum in which IP and IT theft thrives. A collaborative public/private 
partnership with comprehensive industry participation can harness the resources of many 
actors and entities. At the domestic level, organizations like the National Alliance for 
Jobs and Innovation (NAJI)310 hold great promise for a global solution. It is time for a 
multinational approach with unified goals.  
¶107  In February 2013, the Executive Office of the President released the 
“Administration Strategy of Mitigating the Theft of U.S. Trade Secrets,” which urges 
increasing diplomatic efforts, promoting best practices within private industries, 
enhancing domestic law enforcement, pursuing legislative initiatives, and increasing 
public awareness.311 Additionally, multiple guidelines focus on protecting trade secrets 
from misappropriation rather than addressing opportunities for recourse following the 
theft of IP. The report highlights the importance of “logistical controls” and “[s]ecurity, 
especially in the electronic environment.”312 
¶108  The 2013 IP Commission Report provides a comprehensive source of specific 
recommendations for legislative and legal reform.313 Entities in the private sector have 
 
309 Investigating Intellectual Property Theft, SETEC INVESTIGATIONS, http://www.setecinvestigations. 
com/resources/whitepapers/whitepaper5.php (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
310 NAT’L ALLIANCE FOR JOBS & INNOVATION, http://naji.org/  (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). Disclosure 
note: author currently sits on the board of the National Alliance for Jobs and Innovation.  
311 See ADMINISTRATION STRATEGY ON MITIGATING THE THEFT OF U.S. TRADE SECRETS, supra note 9.   
312 Id. at 9. 
 313 IP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 5. The Report further recommends that private entities: 
 
 Designate the national security advisor as the principal policy coordinator  
for . . . the protection of American IP . . . . 
 Provide statutory responsibility . . . to the Secretary of Commerce to serve as the 
principal official to manage all aspects of IP protection . . . .  
 Strengthen the International Trade Commission’s 337 process to sequester 
goods containing stolen IP . . . . 
 Empower the Secretary of the Treasury . . . to deny the use of the American 
banking system to foreign companies that repeatedly use or benefit from the theft of 
American IP . . . .  
 Increase Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation resources to 
investigate and prosecute cases of trade-secret theft, especially those enabled by cyber 
means . . . . 
 . . . . 
 Enforce strict supply-chain accountability for the U.S. government . . . . 
 Require the Securities and Exchange Commission to judge whether companies’ 
use of stolen IP is a material condition that ought to be publicly reported . . . . 
 . . . .  
 Amend the Economic Espionage Act (EEA) to provide a federal private right of 
action for trade secret . . . . 
 Make the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) the appellate court 
for all actions under the EEA . . . . 
 Instruct the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to obtain meaningful sanctions 
against foreign companies using stolen IP . . . .   
 . . . . 
 Build institutions in priority countries that contribute toward a “rule of law” 
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their own cut on the best approach. CREATE.org, mentioned earlier, offers similar 
proactive measures to reduce the risk of, inter alia, trade secret theft.314 
¶109  Assuming some or many of these measures will be implemented, the fact remains 
that the problem of IP and IT theft exists at every level of the social and economic order. 
Ultimately, there are ethical considerations that underlie every purchase choice raising 
these questions: 
 
(1) In some settings within and outside the United States, in countries where the 
financial, personal, and marketplace gains of stealing IP and IT greatly outweigh the risk 
of detection and sanction, will sporadic enforcement in the United States or local courts 
make a meaningful difference in rates of IT and IP theft? 
(2) Both in the United States and abroad, is the integrity of IP and IT a 
meaningful factor in deciding on the choice of goods and services or does the lower cost 
of a pirated product outweigh the importance of compliance with the rule of law?315  
(3) In those countries where there is little or no protection for trade secrets or 
confidential proprietary commercial information, is it realistic to expect that consumers 
will use IP integrity as a central variable in buying choices?316   
(4) In countries where the government condones or participates in trade secret 
theft, will consumers, sua sponte, view IP integrity as important?317   
 
environment in ways that protect IP . . . .  
 Develop a program that encourages technological innovation to improve the 
ability to detect counterfeit goods. Prize competitions have proved to be both 
meaningful and cost-effective ways to rapidly develop and assess new  
technologies . . . .  
 Establish in the private, nonprofit sector an assessment or rating system of levels 
of IP legal protection, beginning in China but extending to other countries as well . . . .  
 . . . . 
 Support American companies [to] identify and recover IP stolen through cyber 
means. 
 
Id. at 4–6.  
 314 CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, TRADE SECRET THEFT, supra note 270, at 21. 
“[C]ompanies should: (1) conduct a strategic assessment of the company’s trade secrets, (2) undertake 
appropriate pre-contractual due diligence, (3) employ strong contractual protections, backed by enforceable 
audit rights and penalties, (4) utilize appropriate operational and security measures, and (5) take appropriate 
action after the business relationship has ended.” Id. The first measure suggests that a company “[e]stablish 
an internal trade secrets policy,” “[i]ntegrate into the company’s supplier code of conduct,” and “[c]onsider 
which trade secrets should be transferred to suppliers.” Id. at 22. The second measure suggests that a 
company “[c]onduct an assessment to ensure that potential suppliers are able to protect the company’s 
secrets” and  “[e]valuate other IP-related issues.” Id. at 23. The fourth measure  suggests that a company 
“[b]uild a culture of compliance” and use “[t]echnological safeguards.” Id. at 24. For example, 
technological safeguards such as special codes, encryptions, etc., would fulfill the fourth measure’s 
protective goal.  Id. The fifth measure suggests that a company “[r]emind departing employees of their 
continuing obligation not to disclose trade secrets” and “[e]nsure that former business partners do not leak 
trade secrets.” Id. at 25. 
315 See Thorin Klosowski, Why I Stopped Pirating and Started Paying for Media, LIFEHACKER (Mar. 14, 
2013, 8:00 AM), http://lifehacker.com/5990525/why-i-stopped-pirating-and-started-paying-for-media. 
Sometimes, consumer choice is affected by a quality differential. For example, certain types of cloud 
software offer digital downloads across multiple devices, while pirated versions do not, making them less 
appealing to consumers. See id.  
316 See Sonia Baldia, Intellectual Property in Global Sourcing: The Art of the Transfer, 38 Geo. J. Int’l 
L. 499, 506, 510–11 (2007).   
317 See CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE ENTER. & TRADE, TRADE SECRET THEFT, supra note 270, at 19. 
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(5) If IP owners have few options beyond public shaming318 or boycotting 
companies that take advantage of unauthorized IP, does it seem likely that a regime of IP 
protection will spring into existence?319 
 
¶110  Since the answer to these admittedly slanted questions is no, the need for self-help 
(an inexact methodology at best) has prompted private-sector law firms to craft advice 
and warning lists for their clients who have global IP and IT exposure.320 Where they can 
afford it, private victims also seek access to the courts as part of the solution to 
addressing IP and IT theft, but “civil enforcement alone is insufficient to address the 
increasingly sophisticated nature and broad scope of IP infringement.”321   
¶111  The real challenge, and opportunity, lies in a partnership between all those involved 
in public and private enforcement and standard setting. After a review of some of the 
state, federal, and international enforcement efforts, and a look at the activity of private-
sector entities, associations, and individuals, the only truism that seems defensible is that 
the future of intellectual property rights must involve collaborative and coordinated 
efforts that span the globe and optimize the use of each entity.322   
¶112  The recommendation of a massive new partnership is based on the successes, 
failures, and challenges discussed in this Article. Progress and setbacks are evident at 
every level, both domestic and international, whether one studies the enforcement 
actions, accomplishments, and shortcoming of governmental entities, or the efforts of 
nongovernmental parties and associations. No matter how one assesses each of these 
efforts to protect IP and IT, there is almost no meaningful collaboration or collective 
action on behalf of rights holders.   
 
318 See Higgins, supra note 305, at 170 (“[S]oftware piracy literature has also shown that individuals are 
likely to perform a behavior when they believe the behavior to be ethical rather than unethical . . . .”). 
319 See MITCHELL III ET AL.,  supra note 73. 
320 White & Case LLP offered the following suggestions for mitigating the risks of IP theft: “[k]now 
your supply chain,” “[p]rotect yourself contractually,” institute policies for “compliance training and 
awareness building,” “[p]ublicize your policy and work with industry groups,” and “[t]ake the lead in 
developing new strategies, rules and best practices.” Id. at 16–17. A thorough knowledge of the supply 
chain is essential because “audits alone will not solve the problem” since many companies, often Chinese, 
hire consultants as plants within companies. Id. at 16. Contractual protections can place the burden of risk 
on the supplier; form the basis for terminating the relationship if violations occur; and provide 
indemnification if the company is sued by a U.S. plaintiff. Id. Publicizing company policies in regulatory 
filings, publications, and company websites further mitigates these threats. Id. at 17. Finally, companies 
should work together to define industry-wide best practices in monitoring supply chains for unauthorized 
IP. Because these best practices do not currently exist, business coalitions, national governments, and 
international organizations should work to implement these necessary measures. Id. at 17. See also Kappos, 
supra note 62 (discussing how state attorneys general are using unfair competition law to combat 
international IP theft). 
321 COMPUTER CRIME & INTELLECTUAL PROP. SECTION, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECUTING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY CRIMES 4 (4th ed. 2013).   
322 There are a number of international organizations—some mentioned earlier in this Article—that 
include public and private members and are involved in education, standard setting, and enforcement. 
Many require all members to report regularly on activities undertaken to achieve the objectives of the 
group. Some are dedicated to prevention of IP and IT theft. As noted earlier, none have the reach, juridical 
force, resources, membership, reliable enforcement mechanisms, and other features of a true 
multidimensional transnational partnership. See supra note 1. See also, for example, the International Code 
of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (Nov. 9, 2010), available at http://www.icoc-psp.org/, 
which as of September 1, 2013, had 708 signatory companies agreeing to abide by the governance, 
compliance, and accountability standards defined therein.    
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¶113  Governments and individuals independently seek solutions—often with great 
commitment and energy—and yet the impact of IP and IT theft detailed at the start of this 
Article speaks for itself. There are powerful groups, such as the MPAA,323 RIAA,324 and 
software industry groups,325 that function independently but are not collaborating on 
copyright infringement. Similarly, many groups committed to preventing or limiting 
patent infringement and theft of trade secrets, while having the interests of different 
stakeholders, share a common overall mission—and yet do not collaborate. To 
paraphrase Benjamin Franklin,326 since these groups do not “hang together,” they run a 
fairly high risk of “hanging alone.”327 
V. CONCLUSION 
¶114  Partnership allows for widespread buy-in on the basic premise of this work: IP and 
IT theft exacts an enormous price and suppresses innovation, invention, creativity, and 
efficiency.   
¶115  This premise can be the theme of an ongoing, multinational conference or 
partnership. That much of IP and IT theft takes place in countries like India and China, as 
suggested throughout this Article,328 means that such countries must be included in this 
effort or it has no hope of succeeding. Partners in such a collaboration could: 
 
(1) Meet and exchange information about successes and challenges in IP and IT 
protection. 
(2)  Pledge to enforce fully in courts and agencies the rights of IP and IT owners 
and report on all enforcement action. 
(3) Serve as a standard-setting organization, articulating criteria, proposed 
statutory and regulatory measures, and best-practice rules. 
(4)  Report on new in-country rules and standards. 
(5)  Enforce standards within its membership.  
(6)  Commit all member governments to enforce IP and IT rights.   
(7)  Review domestic laws and work to promulgate and implement new standards 
that facilitate enforcement of IP and IT rights.  
(8)  Create a worldwide registry and labeling symbology for products and 
producers that are compliant.  
(9)  Fund and support educational and other marketing efforts to communicate in 
every market and in every country the basic ideas regarding the wrongfulness and 
hazards of IP and IT theft.  
(10) Adhere to, internalize, replicate, and enforce “back home” the basic premise 
above.   
 
 
323 MOTION PICTURE ASS’N OF AM., http://www.mpaa.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).  
324 RECORDING INDUS. ASS’N OF AM., http://www.riaa.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).  
325 See, e.g., SOFTWARE & INFO. INDUS. ASS’N, http://www.siia.net/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014).  
326 But see The Inquiring Mind, PUB. BROAD. SERV. (2002), http://www.pbs.org/benfranklin/ 
l3_inquiring_little.html (reporting that Benjamin Franklin did not own patents for his many inventions).  
327 Benjamin Franklin, Remarks at the Continental Congress before the signing of the U.S. Declaration 
of Independence (July 4, 1776) (“We must, indeed, all hang together, or most assuredly we shall all hang 
separately.”).  
328 See supra notes 36–38, 62, 267–269 and accompanying text. 
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¶116  This partnership will need global reach, substantial resources, and participation by 
as many as possible of the public and private actors involved in the activity discussed in 
this Article.   
¶117  A partnership of this nature, focused on the above goals, is complex without ready 
analogue.329 Membership could include—from every member country—local, state, and 
federal prosecutors; governmental officials, politicians, and policymakers; representatives 
of domestic and multinational organizations; representatives of the various executive 
branches and independent agencies of member governments; corporations; trade 
associations; academicians; and representatives of interest groups, from authors and 
software developers to artists, musicians, and select entrepreneurs.  
¶118  In this setting, condemnation of IT and IP theft can become part of the social and 
legal fiber, common and shared, an unquestionable part of the basic and fundamental set  
of universal governing principles.
 
329 Currently, no organizations or initiatives exist that are capable of achieving the goals articulated in 
this Article. See, e.g., WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int/portal/en/ (last visited Sept. 
5, 2014); GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROP. CTR., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, http://www.theglobalip 
center.com/about/mission-and-goals/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014); INT’L ASS’N FOR THE PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROP., https://www.aippi.org/?sel=aims (last visited Sept. 5, 2014); INT’L INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. INST., http://iipi.org/2010/07/background/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014); INT’L INTELLECTUAL PROP. 
ALLIANCE, http://www.iipa.com/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014); NAT’L CRIME PREVENTION COUNCIL, 
http://www.ncpc.org/topics/intellectual-property-theft/ncpcs-intellectual-property-theft-campaign (last 
visited Sept. 5, 2014); Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, http://eiti.org/eiti (last visited Sept. 5, 
2014); FAIR LABOR ASS’N, http://www.fairlabor.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014); International Code of 
Conduct for Private Security Service Providers, http://www.icoc-psp.org/ (last visited Sept. 5, 2014). 
